




Comitato Europeo per la Formazione e L'Agricoltura
European Centre for Education and Agriculture
(CEFA)

End of Term Review



Development of Rice Cultivation, Processing and
Marketing in Jowhar and Qorioley Districts

EU Contract No. SO/0014/IT-COF/2000



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Most of all I would like to thank Alberto Rognoni who was with me throughout the review for his companionship and in-depth insights and knowledge of the situation that certainly contributed to a more thorough analysis of the project.

Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Rehabilitation Association
CARE	Campaign for American Relief Everywhere
Cefa	Comitato Europeo per la Formazione e L'Agricoltura
CIDP	Crop Improvement and Development Project
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
ICRISAT	International Centre for Research in the Semi Arid Tropics
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
M and E	Monitoring and Evaluation
PRA	Participatory Rapid Appraisal
RGA	Rice Growers Association
RMA	Rice Millers Association
SACB	Somali Aid Coordination Body
SAASV	Strengthening Agricultural Activity in the Shabelle Valley
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
SMART	S-specific, M-measurable, A-achievable, R-Realistic and T-Time bound
SWOT	Strengths/ weaknesses/ Opportunities / Threats Analysis
TA	Technical Assistance
TM	Technical Manager
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
UNA	"one" – coalition of seven Italian NGO's

Executive Summary

CEFA has been working in Southern Somalia for many years, particularly in the agricultural sector, focusing on the re-introduction of rice cultivation in partnership with local communities and the EU Somalia Unit based in Nairobi. From 1996 to the present, rice cultivation has been re-established in Jowhar District, Middle Shabelle through the implementation of three project phases.

The purpose of this review is to determine the extent to which the project has reached its objectives at the end of Phase III and to make recommendations for the new Phase IV. One consultant together with a former Cefa Project Manager, Alberto Rognoni, and various members of the former Phase III staff, carried out the review mission.

The project started out as a rehabilitation project but it has progressed to a potentially longer-term development project. It is not easy to live and work in Somalia, even for Somalis; but this project has continued to make considerable progress through maintaining good and close relationships with all stakeholders in the project areas.

The basic philosophy has been that of building on traditional structures, using what people know and can do for themselves and going at their own pace. This has shown that it can help to calm a very violent and lawless situation and can encourage people to give value to peace and security because their focus is on food security and economic production. In this regard, the project design has been both realistic and productive albeit with a few problems due to insecurity.

Cefa will implement Phase IV as well as another project named 'Strengthening of Agricultural Activities in Shabelle Valley' (SAASV). This second project overlaps in geographic area and content with Phase IV. Further, SAASV is part of a coalition of 4 INGOs (Cefa, CARE, Concern Worldwide and ADRA) who will conduct parallel activities in different and overlapping geographical areas. Within this coalition, CARE will be the lead agency for social mobilisation activities for all partners – providing technical backstopping in this field. Cefa will be the lead agency in the field of technical infrastructure development and agricultural development, again providing support to the other partners when requested.

It is therefore important that all partners make clear agreements, with regard to both community and technical development approaches and that both aspects are consistent in all areas. This concern then directly affects the implementation of Phase IV. Documents for each of the Cefa projects do not detail the exact operational relationship and this should be clarified before negotiation and agreement with the coalition partners is made.

In all the three phases of this project, this is the first evaluation carried out. No formal monitoring system exists, however there is a high level of participation by farmers and all the extension workers are local, so at the local level there has been continuous monitoring. Cefa operates a very decentralised organisational management system where project managers have considerable freedom to manage projects without any direction or coordination from country office or head office, and communicate directly with donors. This is a positive situation that allows for local participatory and rapid decision-making. There is a close support system from the Nairobi office, which involves frequent field visits of 7-10 days or if necessary immediate support. There is close daily radio contact with all projects. Nevertheless, there is no apparent monitoring and evaluation system within the organisation. This means that there is no means by which the organisation can identify unintended directions and there is no way to learn

from individual projects and share the learning with other projects and other organisations. New staff coming into Cefa are briefed on the organisation, and on the project then get close backup for a while until they become familiar with their situation.

Quality of Results

Result	Planned Achievements	Actual Achievements
1. Rice Production Increased	600 ha under cultivation per season, with an average production of 2.7 tons/ ha	Average cultivation during Project- 377 ha Peak cultivation 1008 ha. Ave. production rate 1.8-4.2 t/ ha. ¹
2. Marketing Developed	1,000 tons of produce processed and 500 tons marketed per season	219 tons processed in GU season'00 140 tons marketed in that season
3. Local Institutions operating	Two Rice Growers Associations and One Rice Milling Association operating <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities implemented by the organisations • Financial sustainability of the organisations 	Three RGAs exist One RMA exists but is not operating. The RGAs are not functioning well. They do not implement by themselves and do not have financial stability.

The Results, planned achievements and actual achievements are shown above.

If the peak production of rice is considered, then the 1008 tons produced exceeds planned expectations. However, changing market conditions and insecurity factors have kept the average annual production down at only 377 tons. This appears to be pretty volatile because expanded production can come up quite quickly in the right conditions but drop again when not right. The processing and marketing performance have not reached the expected levels largely because of insecurity concerns. The RGAs and RMA have not reached expected levels of sustainability partly because they haven't had the continuity of technical support needed to operate sustainably and partly because rice production levels have been depressed. Nevertheless, the quality of rice production in the area has generated real interest amongst farmers and the quality of the rice itself has been sufficient to attract traders to buy and export from the area. The rice growing/processing aspects need strong and continuous support over the next phase.

Overall Outcome

It would be difficult to claim that the whole improved situation in the region is due to the Cefa project alone as there are many other factors contributing, not least, the effects of cattle bans and TNG interventions in the rice market. Nevertheless, it would be fair to claim that this project (Phase I-III) has made a significant contribution to improving food security in the area and to increasing livelihood possibilities.

¹ Theoretical maximum- 8-10 t/ ha. Practical maximum – 4-5 t/ ha

Summary of Recommendations

It would not be a good idea to operate the two projects separately with different staff in the same areas and with overlapping functions. Cefa's intention is therefore to integrate the two projects from the beginning.

1. The combined agronomic package of the SAASV and CIDP projects should operate with one common strategy and implement one common work plan in the two separate operating areas with total integration of staff and a common staff training programme.
2. A clear management structure is suggested, which leaves the direct management of both projects under the management of the SAASV Project Manager.
3. The combined management team should hold regular meetings to ensure regular communication within the team and form the strategic planning/decision-making group. These meetings should take place at agreed regular time intervals (say quarterly at TM level and monthly at Extension Team level). The frequency of meetings should be used as an indicator in the Project M and E system.
4. There should be a development capacity building component introduced at the Results level.
5. The Project Team should invite farmer representatives to take part in a Project Advisory Group so that discussions and decisions do not take place without local involvement. This includes making decisions about canal rehabilitation. Basically the Project Team should not be making decisions about which canal to open or which crop to trial without full participation of farmers (not businessmen).
6. CIDP should be considered the last project that focuses on rice and this would then require a clear exit strategy leaving farmers to continue with their own skills on rice production sustainable RGAs and RMAs.
7. CAASV should consider the canal rehabilitation as a one-phase activity in which case, capacity building of canal committees should be a major task along the lines suggested in 3. above. An exit strategy, which focuses on sustainability, should be written in to the project for this activity. The question 'how will communities maintain canals after the completed rehabilitation?' should be a core question in the baseline surveys being carried out, and it should be a major concern of the management team in implementing the project.
8. CAASV/CIDP should engage in dialogue with farmers about how they manage all their crop production not just rice and including maize, sorghum etc. in order to understand their risk management strategies.

The development and of a comprehensive local and export marketing review should be carried out as soon as possible in order to inform discussions about farmer risk strategies in maintaining livelihoods and food security and to make decisions about crop diversification.
9. The combined project should focus on farmers groups/canal committees with respect to capacity building and dialogue regarding implementation and be less focussed on already established committees.
10. Decisions about which crops should be trialed and promoted should not be decided by CIDP at the outset and should be subject to intensive dialogue with farmers before going

ahead. This means that extension packages should not be developed and trialed until these decisions are made.

11. 'Community contribution' should be interpreted as meaning 'total involvement of a community in the planning, designing, financing, implementing and management of an activity' not just financial or labour contributions to activities planned by someone else. Agreements on financial and material contributions should be made during the joint planning stage. The actual physical contributions made by communities should be accounted for in the same way as project funding and reported as a proportion of total expenditure.
12. The project should finalise activity monitoring indicators before the end of the first six months with each indicator being 'SMART' (S-specific, M-measurable, A-achievable, R-realistic and T-time bound).
13. There is a basic tension between the requirement of the logframe to produce results and the needs of the farmers to absorb the inputs of the project. The project leader will need to effectively balance these demands and needs. It is fundamental that the project should proceed at the absorptive capacity of the communities and be 'demand driven'.
14. Cefa should gather more specific data relating to the impact of TNG and WFP activities on markets and farmers livelihoods. They should liaise with and lobby both the TNG and WFP through the SACB in order to minimise the negative impacts on farmers trying to become self-sufficient and encourage the SACB to better coordinate emergency and rehabilitation activities.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Context of the Review

CEFA has been working in Southern Somalia for many years, particularly in the agricultural sector, focusing on the re-introduction of rice cultivation in partnership with local communities and the EU Somalia Unit based in Nairobi.

From 1996 to the present, rice cultivation has been re-established in Jowhar District, Middle Shabelle and introduced in the first time in Lower Shabelle through the implementation of three project phases. Pure seeds were made available by means of local seed multiplication. Farmers were continuously trained and supported, A Local Rice Growers Association was re-established and until March 2001 in Jowhar was operating with some success. In Lower Shabelle three new RGAs have been established. The last part of the second phase began to focus on rice processing and produce marketing in order to complete the cycle from production to processing to marketing (see Figure 1). This was continued through the third phase where processing, marketing and capacity building of the Growers and Milling Associations were intended to be the main activities.

A further phase has now been designed titled 'Crops Improvement and Diversification-Cultivation, Processing and Marketing in the Shabelle Valley'. This builds on the experiences and lessons learnt from the past and seeks to promote an expanded approach to diversification.

Phase	Period	Achievements
1	March 1996-April 1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two kg of rice seed of the original type used IR22 and IR24 was obtained from IRRRI after two seasons of seed multiplication 14.59 tons of pure rice seed was produced by the farmers. 1,930 farmers were trained on rice cultivation methods. Total area under cultivation increased from zero to 1,700 ha. 24 km of canal was rehabilitated using participatory, community-based approaches and increasing command area by 5,300 ha. Two new rice varieties from IRRRI were tested and IR64 found to be appropriate.
2	May 1997-March 2000	<p>In Jowhar:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adoption of IR64 rice variety. Establishment of Rice Growers Association supported including management of revolving fund and provision of technical Assistance to farmers. Revolving fund recovery increased from initial 88% to 91.1% in <i>Deyr</i> 98/99 season. Development of rice processing and produce marketing to encourage sustainability. Support for second rice processing association. From March 1996 to August 1999 1,017 ha cultivated with pure seed with production of 2,476 tons rice (average 2.7 tons/ ha). <p>Lower Shebelle</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduction of rice cultivation on small-scale. Establishment of Rice Growers Association but not yet fully operational. Potential created for large-scale introduction of rice production.
3	April 2000-September 2001	Subject of this review

Figure 1. Review of Phases I-III projects

In 1998 the programme extended its activities to Qorioly District in Lower Shabelle with the aim of introducing rice cultivation as a contribution to food security and as an alternative crop in the region subsequent to the international market crisis on Somali bananas. The initial pilot activities have been completed and will now form the basis for larger scale replication in the new project.

1.2 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference are detailed in Annex A.

1.3 Methodology

The methodology used involved:

- Reviewing the available documentation;
- Holding meetings with Mr. Alberto Rognoni and Mr Robert Hughes of Cefa and Stephanie Kouassi and Christoff Langenkamp of EU in Nairobi;
- Holding briefings with Cefa staff in Jowhar and carrying out a SWOT analysis;
- Carrying out field visits in the project area;
- Holding focus group discussions with communities at project sites;
- Conducting wealth ranking and cropping pattern exercises in the field with farmers groups in Barey, Bennaani, Jowhar Somali and Qorioley;
- Holding a Phase IV review seminar with former Cefa staff in Jowhar and carrying out a SWOT analysis;
- Holding meetings with RGA committees in Jowhar, Qorioley and Janaale;
- Observing rice milling in Golweyn;
- Holding a debriefing meeting with Cefa and EU in Nairobi.

1.4 Review Itinerary

Date	Morning	Evening
Saturday April 6 th	Travel – Nairobi – Jowhar via Echo Flight	Visit rice milling facility
Sunday, 7 th	Meeting with administration Meeting with staff	Visit to canals in the North West of Jowhar
Monday, 8 th	Meeting with extension workers Meeting with RGA	Visit to Duchessa Da'Aosta canal area
Tuesday, 9 th	Visit to Barrey village Visit to Bennaaney village Discussions with farmers	Reviewed Project Quarterly Reports Met with Moiko Farmers committee
Wednesday 10 th	Visit to Kulundi and Jowhar Somali villages Discussion with farmers	Meeting with Cefa Staff to discuss phase IV
Thursday 11 th	Travel to Merka	
Friday 12 th	Report writing	

Saturday 13 th	Visit to Janaane – met with RGA, Qorioley – met with RGA and Golweyn- met with women’s group in production areas, visited rice milling operation in town	
Sunday 14 th	Read SAASV documentation Discussions with SAASV staff on project management structure	Report writing
Monday 15 th	Visit to Handumaan farmers group. Discussions	Visit to Cefa office in Qorioley Town. Further discussion on project management structure SAASV/ CIDP-IV
Tuesday 16 th	Attended coordination meeting of coalition group in Merka at CARE office	Report writing
Wednesday 17 th	Report writing: Attended plenary session of coalition group	Report writing
Thursday 18 th	Travel, Merka to K50 to Nairobi via Echo flight	
Friday 19 th	Meetings with Cefa and with EU Somalia Unit	

2 Relevance

The appropriateness of project objectives to the problems that they are supposed to address, and the physical and policy environment within which it operates.

2.1 Identification and Formulation Process

Cefa has been working in the Middle Shebelle area from as early as 1992. It was farmers in the Jowhar area that suggested trying to re-establish rice production. Cefa made the link with IRRI and tried to obtain the same seeds used earlier in the area. The only place where these could be found was in the IRRI gene bank from which they obtained 1kg of IR22 and 1kg of IR24. From here Cefa produced a project proposal of seed multiplication starting on one farmer's farm then making the seed available to others. The rest of the process to date is described in brief above under context. Each step of the project development has involved local farmers incorporating their ideas, responding to perceived needs as they emerged including the re-establishment of a revolving fund on a pilot basis and the re-establishment of Rice Growers and Rice Millers Associations. The EU Somali Office in Nairobi has been instrumental in encouraging and supporting this process, in accepting the inevitable setbacks that occur in Somalia on a too regular basis but in maintaining focus on achieving long-term project goals.

2.2 Realism of the Project Design

Recent Somali history has been about the collapse of a nation state, about anarchy, chaos and confusion. Much of the involvement by the international community in this period has been partly about responding to very real humanitarian need and partly contributing to the chaos through the failure to make the shift from an emergency focussed mentality to a recovery and development approach. In the midst of this, Cefa has taken a long-term process oriented, community-based, participatory and step-by-step approach going very quickly when possible then going slowly and patiently when necessary.

The basic philosophy has been that of building on traditional structures, using what people know and can do for themselves and going at their own pace. This has been shown that it can help to calm a very violent and lawless situation and can encourage people to give value to peace and security because their focus is on food security and economic production. In this regard the project design has been both realistic and productive albeit with a problems due to insecurity.

3 Project Preparation and Design

The logic and completeness of the project planning process, and the internal logic and coherence of the project design.

3.1 General Context

The Somali-occupied portion of the Eastern Sahel today stretches for over 1,000 km from Djibouti along the southern Gulf of Aden littoral to Cape Gardafui, and then south-west to Kenya, with the Indian Ocean on its eastern flank. Two perennial rivers, the Shabelle and the Jubba (Genale in Ethiopia), which rise in the Ethiopian Highlands, cut across the Somali peninsula on their way to the Indian Ocean, converging just north of the port of Kismayu. According to Professor I.M.Lewis¹, the area between the Shabelle and the Jubba was not always occupied by Somalis but was previously occupied by a mixed Bantu population, described by Arab geographers as Zenji, a large number of whom used to live in the riverine agricultural areas of Somalia as farmers. About the 10th Century AD the regions to the north of the Shabelle River were occupied by the Cushitic Oromo, with a fringe of Somali on the Coast opposite the Gulf of Aden. But by the end of the 17th Century the Somalis had driven their Cushitic kinsmen south-westwards from their grazing lands². Professor Charles Gesheker notes that Somalis have inhabited northeast Africa for 2,500 years³.

By the 19th Century, with Somali pastoralists occupying almost the entire Somali Peninsular, beyond the Jubba River the Euro-sapians⁴ returned to Africa. European powers namely Britain, France and Italy engaged in debate with King Menelik II for the territorial acquisitions from the Red Sea to the Kenya border on the Indian Ocean. The negotiations were not simple because the Europeans had not expected to find an Ethiopian King whom had territorial ambitions of his own. Menelik was claiming land as far West as Khartoum and as far South as the Tana River in Kenya and to the Indian Ocean. So the Euro-Abyssinian colonial boundaries in the Somali Peninsula were written into International Law in a short period during the 1890's to 1934 based on compromises made recognising the relative needs of these colonial powers. In the intervening years the entire area has been unstable politically and subject to increasing drought impacts.

In 1977 the Somali National Army invaded what is now the Somali National Regional State, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army repulsed this invasion but the impact on the people and economy of the area was devastating. Many inhabitants were displaced particularly into Somalia and to Northern Kenya and stayed there as refugees until the Siyad Barre regime in Somalia collapsed in 1991 (in the same year the EPRDF government came to power in Ethiopia after fifteen years of civil conflict). At this time these same Somali people were displaced back into Ethiopia, where they had originally come from.

The last decade (1990-2000) has been particularly difficult from a climatic point of view. The collapse of the Somali Government took place in the middle of a severe and lasting drought (1991-1994) that affected most of Somalia, large parts of Ethiopia (in particular the Somali Region) and large parts of Kenya (particularly the Northern and Eastern pastoral areas).

¹ Lewis, I.M. The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa, Jour. Of Af Hist., vol 1, no. 2, 1960

² Ibid

³ Gesheker, C., "The Death of Somalia in Historical Perspective" p.55 in *Mending Rips in the Sky*. Red Sea Press, 1997.

⁴ Current Paleontological research increasingly points to the possibility that the human race as we know it began in the Rift Valley and so the colonial incursions during the 19th Century can be seen as a return by Europeans to their original home in Africa.

1995-1996 saw something of a recovery then 1997 was the year of El Nino where large areas suffered heavy rainfall and floods. 1998 was a good year, which was still affected by the residual soil moisture, and good grazing produced by El Nino but the October-November *Deyr* rains were poor as was also the *Gu* and *Deyr* rains in 1999. Three failed rainy seasons in a row showed how little the pastoral economy had recovered from the droughts at the beginning of the decade. The El Nino event of 1997 had another impact. The heavy rains brought on an epidemic of Rift Valley Fever in the lowland areas of Kenya. As a result Saudi Arabia and Yemen imposed a ban on cattle that has not yet been lifted. This had the further complicating effect of closing the major export markets for the cattle of Somalia, Somali Region and Somaliland and further devastating local economies. This ban is still in place although there has been no evidence of further outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever anywhere in the Horn of Africa since 1998.

3.2 Specific Context

Middle Shebelle Region

The region is divided into seven districts with different geographical and economic characteristics. Jowhar district is located along the Shebelle River in one of the most productive agricultural areas in the country, with about 12,000 ha of irrigated land and 64,000 ha of rainfed agricultural land. The population can be divided into different groups:

- Settled farming community,
- Nomadic/ semi-nomadic pastoralists,
- Urban business community.

There is no accurate estimate of the population size but WHO estimates (1998) an average 143,000 people. There are four main ethnic groups in the area:

- Abgal – in the east part of the district and roughly half the population in number,
- Galje'l – in the North and West representing about one fourth of the population,
- Moblen – in the South and West,
- Bantu – all along the river zone and other minor groups.

Lower Shebelle Region

The region is divided into eight districts with different geographical and economic characteristics. Qorioley District is located along the Shebelle River in an equally productive agricultural area of the country with a potential 30,000 ha of irrigated land and 5,000ha of rainfed agricultural land. The population can be divided into three main groups:

- Settled small-scale farmers,
- Nomadic/ semi-nomadic pastoralists,
- Urban business community.

Because of the predominance of nomadic groups it is difficult to estimate accurately the population in the district. WHO estimates (1998) an average of 155,000.

There are four main ethnic groups:

- Jido,
- Bantu,
- Habargidir,
- Minor groups.

3.3 The Project: Development of Rice Cultivation, Processing and Marketing.

The Overall Objective of the project was:
'Food security in the Middle and Lower Shabelle improved'

The Specific Purpose was:
'Sustainable rice production re-established in Middle Shabelle and introduced in Lower Shabelle Region'

Results were:

Result	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
1. Rice Production Increased	600 ha under cultivation per season, with and average production of 2.7 tons/ ha
2. Marketing Developed	1,000 tons of produce processed and 500 tons marketed per season
Local Institutions operating	2 Rice Growers Associations and 1 Rice Milling Association operating

Activities to achieve the Results were:

	Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
1.1	Produce additional Pure Rice Seed	60 tons of pure seed produced.
1.2	Provide technical assistance to farmers	300-400 farmers per season trained
1.3	Increase inputs availability through the revolving fund	200 farmers per season receiving inputs through the revolving fund
1.4	Rehabilitate further irrigation infrastructure	1 irrigation canal rehabilitated
2.1	Rehabilitate rice milling bases	2 buildings rehabilitated
2.2	Install new rice milling units	3 milling units installed and operating
2.3	Develop local and country wide market strategies	1000 tons of produce processed per season 500 tons marketed per season
3.1	Additional support to Rice Growers Associations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities implemented by the organisations • Financial sustainability of the organisations
3.2	Support to Rice Millers Association	

Figure 2. Logical Framework of Phase III

4 Efficiency

The cost, speed and management efficiency with which inputs and activities were converted into results, and the quality of results achieved.

4.1 Means and Costs

The budget headings of the project are shown below in Figure 3. The analysis shows that 35% of the budget was planned for staffing. The equipment input was relatively low as was overhead and operating costs. The main input during the project was technical support and extension, which justifies the staffing costs. The balance of funds remaining is close to budgeted figures with no cost overruns. This suggests that the financial aspects of the project were closely monitored. Financial reporting was regular and on time.

The project was closed in September 2001 and the new phase began in February 2002 – a gap of four months. It is a pity that the balance of funds was not used to keep the project ticking over so as to maintain support to the farmers with local staff. The local staff have shown that they are able to continue support over extended periods.

Budget Headings	Budget Amount	Percent Balance of Budget	Percent Budget Remaining
Staffing costs	158,720	35	3.6
Farm inputs and activities	48,000	10.6	10
Irrigation network infrastructure	45,000	10	0
Equipment	46,500	10.3	0
Milling bases	22,000	5	7.3
Jowhar and Qorioley bases	12,000	2.6	0
Transport	44,400	9.8	1.2
Office equipment and training material	4,000	0.8	21
Communications	10,000	2.2	0
Off-shore base in Nairobi	14,400	3.2	0
Sub total	405,020	90	4.5
Admin overheads	48,980	10	0
Sub total	450,000	100	6.4

Figure 3. Budget Analysis

4.2 Organisation and Management

Cefa- Comitato Europeo per la Formazione e L'Agricoltura – is a non-governmental organisation of international voluntary service established in 1972 to carry out projects that help local populations in a sustainable way.

This review is concerned with the performance of Phase III of the Rice Rehabilitation Project and the following Crop Improvement and Diversification Project (CIDP). Whereas earlier, the Rice Rehabilitation Project Phases I to III was one of the only projects focussing on such activities, this project will operate in a more complex operating environment.

Cefa will implement CIDP as well as another project named 'Strengthening of Agricultural Activities in Shabelle Valley' (SAASV). This second project overlaps in geographic area and content with CIDP. Further, SAASV is part of a coalition of four INGOs (Cefa, CARE, Concern Worldwide and ADRA) who will conduct parallel activities in different and overlapping geographical areas. Within this coalition CARE will be lead agency for social mobilisation activities for all partners – providing technical backstopping in this field. Cefa will be lead agency in the field of technical infrastructure development and agricultural development, again providing support to the other partners when requested.

It is therefore important that all partners make clear agreements, with regard to both community and technical development approaches and that both aspects are consistent in all areas. This concern then directly affects the implementation of the CIDP project. Documents for each of the Cefa projects do not detail the exact operational relationship and this should be clarified before negotiation and agreement with the coalition partners is made.

4.3 Interventions Analysis

Activity 1.1 - Pure rice seed

(Indicator: 60 tons of pure seed produced)

During Phase III, 50,710 kg of pure IR64 seed was produced by the project in Qorioley and Janaale areas. Figure 4 indicates the hectares under rice in the respective project areas. This is enough to plant 1,000 ha, more if pure seed grown by farmers in Lower Shabelle is considered. The project final report suggests that seed heads were not as full as they could have been and that use of phosphorous fertiliser could improve this. Cefa carried out seed multiplication through renting 15 ha of land and producing 50,000kg of IR64. (3.3 t/ ha).

Cultivated areas under improved seed

Phase	Season ⁵	Middle Shabelle	Lower Shabelle
1	Gu'96	83 <>	0
	Deyr'96	44 <>	0
2	Gu'97	186	0
	Deyr'97-98	46*	0
	Gu'98	182	0
	Deyr 98-99	99	14+
	Gu'99	200	12+
3	Deyr 99-00	430	15+
	Gu'00	1008	18+
	Deyr'00-01	100*	59
	Gu'01	150*	191
	Deyr'01-02	230*	75*
	Gu'02	500-600*	No Project

Figure 4. Land area under rice cultivation in Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions

Activity 1.2 -Technical assistance provided to farmers

(Indicator: 300 – 400 farmers trained per season)

Training days were carried out as shown below in both project areas as shown below in Figure 5. As can be seen an average of 575 farmers received training over a range of topics during the project to the extent of 15,730 farmer training days per year, which corresponds well with the indicator of 300-400 farmers. Visual Observation in the field and discussions with farmers in

⁵ <> Cefa covered land cultivation costs; * approximations; + insecurity impact on production

both project areas suggests that the topics covered were relevant and well received. Documented training material is available in written and in picture form. The most valuable training materials at project level are those in picture form.

Area and Season	Number of villages	Number of meetings	Ave. Number per meeting	Total Farmer Training days
GU'00				
Middle Shabelle	11	30	240	7,200
Lower Shabelle	4	18	80	1,440
Deyr'00-01				
Middle Shabelle	11	26	280	7,280
Lower Shabelle	14	33	260	8,580
Gu'01				
Lower Shabelle	12	24	290	6,960
Ave. /year			575 per year	15,730 per year

Figure 5. Training inputs in the project areas

Activity 1.3 - Increased inputs availability through revolving fund

(Indicator: 200 farmers per season receiving inputs through the revolving fund)

The Rice Growers Association (RGA) managed inputs through the revolving fund.

The revolving fund was limited to assistance to 200 farmers as chosen from member villages.

Loans were given of seed and fertiliser then returned at 130% for seed loaned and an equivalent value of paddy rice for fertiliser at 75 kg seed for a 50 kg bag of fertiliser.

In April 2000, in Jowhar, 47,350 kg of fertiliser given out earlier and 41,350 kg equivalent returned (87%). Out of 2,230 kg of seed given out 1,350 was paid back (60%).


Discounts were allowed for farmers who had legitimate problems and who lost production due to floods and fighting in their area.

In Middle Shabelle, prolonged conflict during the Deyr 2000 period led to a complete breakdown of the system. With the coming of a new administration in March 2001 the RGA executive members were replaced by new representatives acceptable to the new administration.

In Janaale during Gu season 2001, 6,125 kg were loaned and 5,980 kg returned (97%). 33,650 kg of urea was loaned and 41,400 kg of paddy rice returned (123%). This represents an improving return rate from previous occasions.

The purpose and value of the revolving fund is well understood but clearly the conflict in Jowhar resulting in a breakdown in the system cannot be seen as a success for the system. The RGAs in the Lower Shabelle have not suffered such a set back and have not yet reached a sustainable level of operation. In general, the principal of the revolving fund is sound and is clearly helpful to farmers who otherwise would have been unable to enter into rice production. However, the disruptions over much of the last phase meant that Cefa could not provide sufficient operational backstopping support to the RGAs in order to build their capacity to sustainable levels.

Activity 1.4 - Rehabilitate further irrigation infrastructure



Duchessa D'Aosta Canal in Jowhar rehabilitated by Cefa under a separate project

Qaloow canal was rehabilitated in Jowhar area over a length of 764 meters. Cefa in Phase II had used this canal under a rental arrangement to produce pure rice seed. At that time the canal was in good condition. There was a request by the farmers for the canal to be rehabilitated but, through discussion, Cefa and the farmers agreed it was not necessary. However, when the new project staff for Phase III came in, the request was raised again as a new idea by the community and this time Cefa agreed to do the work.

Activity 2.1 - Rehabilitate rice milling bases

(Indicator: 2 buildings rehabilitated)

Cefa decided to concentrate on Qorioley and Janaale in Phase III. Previously, Qorioley RGA used mobile machines in specific areas to mill rice. Cefa decided to establish fixed bases so that there would be less wear and tear on the machines – it is easier to control and maintain the machines and there is less possibility of cheating on the amount of rice milled.

The positioning of the two sites has attempted to minimise the transport costs to the farmers. In Janaale the milling base was an old building that was rehabilitated by Cefa. In Qorioley a new building was constructed. Both buildings are in use.

Activity 2.2 - Install new rice milling machines

(Indicator: 3 milling units installed and operating)

Prior to the start of the project (Phase I) the only machines in the area were 20 years old, most in poor condition and spoiling the rice during processing. Three units were purchased in Phase II – two being used by the Jowhar RGA and the other by Janaale RGA. Five more were purchased under Phase III – 1 in the Jowhar Cefa compound – not yet handed over because the official RMA has not yet been recognised, 2 are in Cefa Merka compound to be allocated under Phase IV. The machine in Janaale had problems in performance and was not milling good quality rice⁶. It was repaired but still did not work well. It was then replaced with a new machine but that also did not work so well. A technician from Jowhar came down to the area and adjusted the new one, which has since performed well. The old machine was also repaired and adjusted and loaned for one season to Golwyn community who are also engaged in producing rice and have formed a third RGA in the area. Haduuman/Qorioley also has a new machine, which is working well. These represent enough milling capacity to cover future needs.

⁶ The farmers were milling at a rate of 10 bags per hour which is way above its stable capacity. The rice they were milling was not clean and contained stone, which damaged the screen. Recently Cefa brought a milling specialist from Jowhar who refused to accept all the rice being brought to the mill and advised farmers to clean it properly. He adjusted the old machine and accepted clean rice then advised a milling rate of 5 bags per hour and to constantly monitor quality. Since then both the new machine at Janaale and the repaired machine at Qolweyn have been working well.

Machines have been loaned to the RGAs on a trial basis to see how they manage them. If they perform well they will be handed over to them. No discussion took place with the receiving organisations prior to the loans concerning community contribution to the purchase of these machines, so the understanding in Cefa and in the RGAs is that these machines will be freely given.

A meeting was held with the Janaale RGA that has been operating since early 2001. They are now entering their third season of operation. RGA membership consists of 8 villages, the Executive Committee is 7 members, and the Assembly has 24 members. The Assembly meets four times a year.

The seasons and growing cycle of rice are such that the time of planting is very important. Delayed planting during the critical period can result in a poor harvest. The seasons are illustrated in Figure 6 below. Because of a delayed start to the last Deyr season the farmers are currently preparing land and planting for the Gu season at the same time as they are harvesting from the last crop.

Seasons	Activity
Gu	
Mid-February to March	Nursery Planting
April	Transplanting
Earl August	Harvesting
Deyr	
Mid-September	Nursery
Late October	Transplant
Feb-March	Harvest

Figure 6. Planting Seasons in Lower Shabelle

Activity 2.3 – Develop local and country wide marketing strategies

(Indicator: 1000 tons of produced processed per season; 500 tons of produce marketed per season)

This was intended to be a main component of the project. However, given the insecurity situation, especially in middle Shabelle Region including the occupation of the rice-milling compound in Jowhar for nearly 8 months, the activity was not as successful as planned. The best performance of milling activities was in Gu season 2000 in Jowhar where a total of 219 tons were milled with an income of 21,838,000 Som. Sh. Of these, 108.2 tons were exported to 7 different markets in other parts of Somalia and 31.5 tons exported to Ethiopia.

Activity 3.1 – Additional support to rice growers association

(Indicators: Activities implemented by the organisations; financial sustainability of the organisations).

Formation of RGAs

In Phase II, Cefa staff talked with the farmers involved in rice production. They mentioned that, in the past – 1984-90, a Rice Growers Association (RGA) was set up by farmers, UNDP/World Bank and Commercial Bank using revolving funds. The credit provided by the RGA institution helped farmers to produce more.

There was a saying “Go to Jiddah (for employment in rice schemes) or stay in Jowhar”. So Cefa agreed to help develop a new association. They hired a Somali advocate as a Legal Consultant. He went round and spoke with farmers and helped people to understand the meaning of an association and talked through issues concerning a ‘non-profit association’. He

explained the association would be theirs and that they would send representatives from each village to make up the association's assembly. These representatives would elect an executive committee to manage the activities. Through dialogue with the farmers, a constitution or 'bye-laws' were drawn up to govern the association. Following this, the consultant gave seminars to the villages to teach them on their rights and duties within the association.

Subsequently, each village selected 5-6 representatives to form the General Assembly. Individual members contributed to a village membership of the association. The first task was to manage the revolving fund. Each village drew up a list of people to be assisted by the association and basic rules were agreed as follows:

- A maximum of 200 farmers to be assisted.
- A maximum of 1 ha of rice per farmer assisted.
- Fertiliser input was 4 x 50kg urea/ ha.
- Improved seeds at 300kg/ ha.
- Fertiliser value to be paid back in paddy rice at 75 kg per 50 kg bag of fertiliser.
- Seed to be paid back at 130% of input.
- TA to be provided by Cefa extensionists.

The RGA in Jowhar was proving itself to be inefficient and incompetent in running the organisation and the executive was focusing on its own self-interest. At a General Assembly meeting they were replaced by new individuals who took over in August 2001 but the new members are supporters of the Mohammed Dhereh family and so the question of equitable representation is presently not so clear. However, the original revolving fund assets have disappeared and their whereabouts not clear. Popular opinion is that the old RGA executive members who ran away when Mohammed Dhereh took over the Administration of the region by force in March 2001 took them⁷. During the conflict period, prior to this, farmers reduced their rice hectareage from a peak of 1008 ha to a low of 100-150 ha because of uncertainty of receiving necessary inputs and the risk of being unable to process and sell the harvest. At the same time traders reduced their purchase of fertiliser because of insecurity of transport and the risk of farmers not being willing or able to buy. The farmers replaced the rice crop with increased maize production. After Mohammed Dhereh took over, the widespread conflict was brought under control and the new RGA estimate that the Deyr 01-02 season crop was about 250 ha. The estimated size of the present GU 02 crop is 500-600 ha.

A meeting was held with 6 members of the new RGA Executive Committee and the circumstances surrounding the last 18 months was discussed. They said that formerly they were exporting rice to Binadir, Hiran, Lower Shabelle and elsewhere and that production was down due to:

- Interclan fighting;
- Weak administration (prior to Mohammed Dhereh);
- Pastoralists invading their fields and damaging the rice;
- Looters who took money;

⁷ There have been four Administrations in Middle Shabelle since 1994.

1. Mohamed Dhereh in 1994-1995
2. Mohammed Nur in 1995- 1998. Former Secret Service Head under Mahmmmed Sieyad Barre.
3. Hassen Nur as "acting Governor appointed by elders 1999- 2001
4. The same Mohammed Dere from March 2001 to present. Self appointed.

- ‘No room for farmers’;
- Uncontrolled amounts of free food brought in by CARE and WFP. This damaged moral because market prices became low⁸.

These reasons were crosschecked through focus group discussions with farmer’s leaders and largely found to be consistent.

The issue of CARE and WFP regularly distributing food during harvest periods is a persistent complaint in Jowhar, in Belet Weyne, in Filtu (Ethiopia) and Mandera (Kenya). It seems that during the 2000-2001 drought, excessive amounts of food were dumped in Gode Zone in Ethiopia and large amounts were shipped over the border into Kenya and Somalia to be sold on the markets as far down as Mogadicio.

The RGA stated they do not want relief but they need to cover the costs of input when they do harvest.

Their main priorities were:

- The need for peace.
- Assistance with canal maintenance.
- They pointed out that the rice mill has worked regularly but they need help to re-establish the revolving fund as well as technical assistance from Cefa.
- They also said that the river floods regularly and they need flood relief canal rehabilitation as a priority. They said the task of rehabilitation was too big for them to do by themselves. The main flood relief canals are Dodonle and Sabunne.
- The former river embankment protection by Cefa was a major contribution and encouragement to produce but they suggest extension (lengthening the protected area) as well as help with bridges and roads rehabilitation.
- Significant harvest losses could be reduced if they had a threshing machine.

Milling operating costs estimated during a meeting with the Janaale RGA executive are shown below in Figure 7. The RGAs are subject to market forces in their operations. Whereas earlier in the project, the operations seemed to be functioning at a profitable level, recent conditions as shown below and dominated with problems related to the market conditions make it clear they will run at a loss. One thing that was clear during the field visit is that the milling operations are regarded as important by the participants and in the present situation, the members top up the operation with extra bags of rice but the RGA does not account for this on paper, which is why the operation still functions even though with an apparent paper loss.

⁸ This was a very common complaint. The RGA and the farmers say that the distribution of food when it is not needed is partly a business issue and partly political with pseudo- NGO’s set up to get contracts from CARE and WFP bringing food without respect to any need. CARE in Merka say they have not distributed food in these areas for 18 months and don’t intend to unless requested. WFP does not operate in Middle and Lower Shabelle but surplus food from other areas finds its way in to local markets.

Milling costs

Activity	Cost	Cost Som. Sh.
Labour	Operator – 15,000/ day x 8 hour day 2 assistants- 10,000/ day x 8 hours	280,000/ day
Fuel	8 bags with 5 litres @7,000/l ⁹ 40-80 bags / day 40 - 50 l/ day	350,000 / day
Oil	5 kg per 100 hrs @ 100,000/ 5 kg ¹⁰	8,300/ day
Repairs/ Maintenance	Belts 3-4 per 100 hours @ 120,000/ belt	40,000/ day
Replacement provision	- assume 5 year life @ \$1,200- \$240/ year . \$240/250= US\$ 1/ day ¹¹	21,000/ day
Total Operating	Production 56 bags	699,300/ day
Cost per bag =		12,487.5/ bag
Service Charge =		8,000/ bag ¹²
Net Loss =	(US\$ 0.21)	(4,487.5)

Figure 7. Operating Costs of Janaale RGA Milling operations

Activity 3.2- Support to Rice Millers Association

(Indicators: Activities implemented by the organisations; financial sustainability of the organisations).

The rice mill in Jowhar has not been handed over to the Rice Millers Association (RMA). The new administration will not recognise it and without this acceptance, it's security would not be assured. The administration will only give recognition if the RMA allows its own (administration) people to be involved in decision making of the RMA. The RMA has decided to wait for better circumstances before accepting the mill. There is a close and trusting relationship between Cefa and the RMA and when the situation changes the mill will be handed over. It is important to support the RMA as it provides an alternative to the RGA operation and will force some transparency in the RGA's operations.

4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

In all the three phases of this project, this is the first evaluation carried out. No formal monitoring system exists. However, there is a high level of participation by farmers and all the extension workers are local. There is a sophisticated communication system in the area where everyone is knowledgeable about everything that happens in the community. Cefa's plans and intentions are largely known before they are formed so this is a kind of indigenous monitoring system. This same system has kept Cefa staff safe throughout all the periods of insecurity. Cefa operates a very decentralised organisational management where project managers have considerable freedom to manage projects and communicate directly with donors. This approach seems to work well and allows flexibility in operations.

There is a close support system from the Nairobi office, which involves frequent field visits of 7-10 days or if necessary immediate support. There is close daily radio contact with all projects.

⁹ 10 bags/hour > 5 bags/hour

¹⁰ Every 100 hours @ 8 hours/day is a change every 12 days or 100,000/12= 8,300/day

¹¹ 1,000 ha x 3 t/ ha= 60,000 bags. per year

1 m/c working 7 bags per hour x 8 hours= 56 bags/day

5 days x 50 weeks= 250 working days/year

60,000/250= 240 bags/day. or x machines @ 240/56= 4.3 machines

¹² Milling and bagging costs then represent 3.5% of the market price per bag of rice

Nevertheless there is no apparent formal monitoring and evaluation system within the organisation. This means there is no means by which the organisation can identify unintended directions and there is no way to learn from individual projects and share the learning with other projects and other organisations.

5 Effectiveness

An assessment of the contribution made by Results to achievement of the project Purpose, and how assumptions have affected project achievements.

Project Purpose: <i>“Sustainable rice production re-established in Middle Shabelle and introduced in Lower Shabelle Region”</i>	Indicator: Changes in cropping pattern of single growers and farmers community as a whole.
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Result	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
1. Rice production increased	600 ha under cultivation per season, with and average production of 2.7 tons/ ha
2. Marketing developed	1,000 tons of produce processed and 500 tons marketed per season
3. Local institutions operating	2 Rice Growers Associations and 1 Rice Milling Association operating

Put simply, the project has directly acted as a stabilising force in the area and contributed to the expansion of rice production in the area and the introduction of rice in the Lower Shabelle. It is clear that production, processing and marketing would be significantly higher than it is, if the prolonged periods of insecurity had not held it back. And that enthusiasm for continuing to build rice production in the area is strong. It is also clear that issues surrounding periodic insecurity will need to be addressed directly if all the gains made so far are to become sustainable.

5.1 Capacity Building and Appropriateness of Training Methods

During Phases I and II, Cefa used a cautious, step-by-step learning approach to engaging with the communities in Jowhar area. They did not come with a menu of what Cefa was planning to do and give out during the project. Instead they listened to the farmers and observed what they were doing. It was the farmers who suggested a re-establishment of rice production because they knew it from before and requested help to get it going again. Cefa recruited local extensionists and trained them in all elements of rice production. They in turn developed this into a comprehensive extension package. A written manual exists in English that describes this approach. There is also a picture code manual that is used by the extensionists and farmers to discuss key issues related to production.

The introduction of new varieties and improved cultivation methods was done using a Farmers Participatory Research approach with farmers taking part in each stage of the growing cycle and participating in decisions about how to do things. This has resulted in a high level of uptake of methods and practice. Whilst the project focused only on rice, this has proved an excellent approach and should be continued through Phase IV and with new interventions.

A SWOT analysis was carried out with the former Phase III Project Extension/ Administrative team and this is shown in Figure 8 below¹³.

¹³ The questions were asked- what were the strong and weak points of Phase III and what are the opportunities and threats to phase IV.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitated improved productivity • Strong local knowledge • Knowledge of Local language and good communication with communities • Good at transferring knowledge • Able to give technical assistance • Provide encouragement to farmers • Always present • Able to learn new techniques • Good cooperation with Cefa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No contact with farmers since September 2001 • Revolving fund not operating • No strategy development between different agencies
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved security • Can improve revolving fund • Can create cooperation between extensionists • Recreate extension systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fragile security • Taxes imposed by administration • Imported cereals coming from WFP and TNG

Figure 8. SWOT Analysis carried out with Cefa former extensionists in Jowhar

5.2 Stakeholder Involvement




Figure 9. Stakeholder Analysis in Jowhar Area

The Venn Diagram in Figure 9 above identifies the key stakeholders related to Jowhar farmers and their relationships. There are three key stakeholder groups in the region: irrigating farmers, rain fed farmers, and nomadic pastoralists. This analysis focuses on the irrigating farmers because

a full analysis of interactions with the other two groups would take considerably longer than the time available.

Within a typical village, the most significant institutions are the chief and the elders, there are also what is known as “goob” these are groups of individual farmers who come together to help one another in land preparation, land shaping, planting and harvesting etc. There are also canal committees who are responsible for organising the management of canal maintenance and water use. Sometimes there is one committee in one village that looks after a specific length of canal, other times one committee is made up of representatives from three or four villages depending on the length and perceived ownership. There is also someone usually known as the “owner of the river”. This is a very old tradition and the person holding the position is thought to have magical powers and is able to bless the river in order for it to be supportive of farmers’ activities and to keep crocodiles from attacking people and animals. The formation of the RGA therefore is consistent with other institutions that promote collaboration and control between villages and in principle uses the same pattern of shared representation. However the skill types and levels required in the RGA are new and require considerable Technical Assistance to support the continuity and sustainability of the RGA.

Cefa recruited a number of local village members during Phase I and II and has trained them to a very high technical level on all subjects related to rice production. Their method of operation is basically through local means of communication and accepted ways of adult learning. Their position with regards to villages therefore is somewhere between being Cefa staff and being members of the villages. Because of their new skills and knowledge and their willingness to share the information and provide advice on demand they are highly respected and regarded as part of the village structure. There are also business people in the village who are usually the farmers with the largest land holdings.

The Venn Diagram indicates the relative importance of institutions by the size of the ellipse and by the relative position from the centre of the village circle (in heavy print).

The new administration of Mohammed Dere is considered an unwanted imposition in the Region and not part of the local structure (dotted ellipse) and is shown far from the centre of the village. It remains to be seen how long they will be allowed to remain in the area by the local power structure. The town (Jowhar) is a separate part of the whole structure and there is a complex network of relationships in political and economic terms. There are business people who have strong trading relationships with different parts of Somalia and with particularly the Middle Eastern countries. They are regarded as being vital contributors to the economy. There are also a couple of other NGOs – Inter SOS who provides medical services in the town hospital, and MSF Spain who provide more rural health support in the region.

The EU supports Cefa, and because of Cefa, it is well known and respected. WFP and CARE are known and have a negative reputation because they give food through local NGOs, who, it is thought, deliberately bring food at harvest times to undermine the local economy. WFP and CARE¹⁴ are considered to be politically biased as are MSF Spain. Cefa in Jowhar is respected because they try to work through all families. Finally, SACB is not known in the villages but is shown here as an institution that ought to have a major influence on affairs in the region but is considered by farmers as ‘far away’ and, if anything, in contributing to bringing confusion rather than peace and stability to the area. This is because there is no coordination or collaboration with other stakeholders.

¹⁴ CARE says they have not brought food into the area for more than 18 months, responding to local requests not to do so.

Land ownership and Cropping Patterns

Cefa policy has been to offer support through TA to all farmers and revolving funds to a maximum of 200 farmers in each operating area (Middle and Lower Shabelle)

For each of the 200 farmers, the assistance is defined as support to 1 ha of rice cultivation which amounts to 50kg of pure seed and 300kg of urea (6 x 50kg bags in three applications)

Discussions were held with several farmer groups in Jowhar and Qorioley on a range of topics including land distribution. Using a wealth ranking approach the following data in Figure 10 was gathered.

Middle Shabelle

Farmers Group	Assets	Well off	Average	Poor
Barrey	Land	10-15 ha	4-5 ha	0.5-1.0 ha
	Cattle	30-35	0	0
	Shoats	0	0	0
	Camels	0	0	0
	% of 570 families	2-3%	30%	67-68%
Bannaaney	Land	12 ha	3-4	1
	Animals	0	0	0
	% of 330 families	7%	78%	15%
Moiko	Land	6	2-3	1
	Animals	0	0	0
	% of 170 families	3-4	50-60	37-47
Jowhar Somali	Land	6-7	2-3	1
	Animals	0	0	0
	% of 300 families	4%	33%	63%

Lower Shabelle

Farmers Group	Assets	Well off	Average	Poor	Very Poor
Haduuman		5-20	3-5	1-3	0
	% families	15%	25%	20%	40%

Figure 10. Wealth Ranking of families in the Middle and Lower Shabelle Areas

Wealth then is measured in land holdings with very few of the richer farmers keeping some cattle. Typically, in Jowhar, there is a small percentage of relatively large landowners (6-15%), a sizeable group of middle-income farmers (3-5ha) and a larger group of poor farmers 50-80%.¹⁵

There is a distinction between the Gu season and the Deyr season. For instance, in Barrey, the middle-income farmers plant 1 ha of rice, 1 ha of maize and a third to tomatoes and pulses. Normally they intercrop pulses with the maize. In the Deyr season they plant 2 ha of simsim and ½ ha of rice and ½ ha of maize depending on how good the Gu season was.

In Bannaaney the larger farmers plant 6 ha of maize, 2 ha rice, 2 ha simsim and 2 of tomatoes and watermelons. The middle farmers plant 1 ha rice, 2 ha maize and 1ha simsim and watermelon. The poor farmers grow maize only.

In Jowhar Somali, richer farmers planted 2 ha rice, 4 ha maize in Deyr season 2001, the middle and poor groups all maize. In the present Gu season the larger farmers have planted 1 ha rice and the rest maize, the rest all maize.

¹⁵ In Bannaaney, this is different with most farmers being in the middle group. This survey was based on very few villages and so gives only an indication not a fair representation of land distribution.

Basically, it is the larger farmers and wealthier middle group farmers who take the risk of growing rice. All farmers see rice as a desirable but risky crop. The input costs are high but the output of a good crop is way above any other crop they plant so they will do it if they think they can succeed. Poorer farmers cannot grow rice. They do not have enough land to maintain both a subsistence crop of maize and grow rice. Even if they take an inputs loan they don't have the means to pay for labour costs. They benefit from the project by providing labour for the wealthier farmers but in doing so they neglect their own crops and suffer a lower yield as a result.

So the whole process of planting and crop production is based on how much land someone has, the relative risks in producing a cash crop and the basic food security needs of each family. Given these dynamics, farmers have a ratio of consumption to sales capacity, as shown below in Figure 11. Wealthier and middle-income families have the same pattern but poorer ones sell nothing of their crop and sell their labour to gain additional income.

Crop	Wealthier		Middle income		Poorer	
	Consumption	Sale	Consumption	Sale	Consumption	Sale
Maize	60%	40%	60%	40%	100%	0
Rice	5%	95%	5%	95%	0	0
Simsim	0%	100%	0%	100%	0	0

Figure 11. Household consumption and sales in Middle Shabelle

Lower Shabelle

The situation in the Lower Shebelle is very different. The wealthy group represent 15% with farms 5-20 ha in size. The middle group 3-5 ha are 25% of the whole. The poor group include 20% with 1-3 ha of land but there is a large group of 40% with no land at all. These live in the towns and survive by providing labour to other farmers. Many of the landless used to be employed in the Italian (then Somali) commercial farmers and became unemployed during the civil war. The commercial farmers are showing signs of reactivating banana production and are in dialogue with American and Italian private companies to negotiate export possibilities. The Somali banana industry collapsed when they lost quotas for export to EU. The quotas were lost due to trade agreements between the EU and USA when the USA challenged the EU through the World Trade Organisation. A major impact in Somalia was the collapse of the industry and major job losses contributing to poverty increase and to insecurity. The further loss of livestock exports to the Middle East because of the Saudi ban caused serious loss of income, increases in poverty and insecurity. With the drought conditions of the last three years, this has aggravated the level of conflict between farmers and pastoralists. Further negative contributions are the recent gifts of large quantities of rice to the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) from Saudi Arabia and Libya. The TNG are selling this rice to traders in order to raise money to pay civil servants. They traders buy at 200,000Som Sh. per bag and then sell on the market at 280,000/ 300,000 Som. Sh.

This has completely undercut the market for project rice because the traders got a better deal from the government and are no longer interested in marketing local Rice. The RGAs in Qorioley and Janaale are selling rice now at 150,000 Som. Sh./ bag whereas they previously sold for 220,000/ 240,000 per bag. It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary or longer-term situation.

5.3 Quality of Results

The Results, planned achievements and actual achievements are shown below in Figure 12. If the peak production of rice is considered, then the 1008 tons produced exceeds planned expectations. However, changing market conditions and insecurity factors have kept the average production down at only 377 tons. This appears to be pretty volatile because expanded production can come up quite quickly in the right conditions, but drop again when not right. The processing and marketing performance have not reached the expected levels, largely because of insecurity concerns. The RGAs and RMA have not reached expected levels of sustainability partly, because they haven't had the continuity of technical support needed to operate sustainably, and, partly, because rice production levels have been depressed. Nevertheless, the quality of rice production in the area has generated real interest amongst farmers and the quality of the rice itself has been sufficient to attract traders to buy and export from the area. The rice growing/processing activities need strong and continuous support over the next phase.

Result	Planned Achievements	Actual Achievements
1. Rice Production Increased	600 ha under cultivation per season, with and average production of 2.7 tons/ ha	Average cultivation during Project- 377 ha Peak cultivation 1008 ha. Ave. production rate 1.8-4.2 t/ ha. ¹⁶
2. Marketing Developed	1,000 tons of produce processed and 500 tons marketed per season	219 tons processed in GU season'00 140 tons marketed in that season
3. Local Institutions operating	Two Rice Growers Associations and One Rice Milling Association operating <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities implemented by the organisations • Financial sustainability of the organisations 	Three RGAs exist One RMA exists but is not operating The RGAs are not functioning well They do implement by themselves but not well and do not have financial stability.

Figure 12. Indicators of Activities' Achievement

5.4 Performance of the Revolving Fund

The revolving loan fund is a major enabling factor motivating and allowing new growers to participate in rice growing when other factors suggest this would be a reasonable risk to take. The inputs to the revolving loan fund are shown in Figure 13 below.

	Activity	GU 99	Deyr 99	Gu 00	Deyr 00	Gu 01	Deyr 01
Johawhar							
1.3	Increase inputs through RF Return	60MT Urea. 3 MT seed	Revolving original amount	47.35 t out 41.35 t returned (87%)	Loaned not returned	0	0
			430	1008	100	150	250
Qorioley							
		0	0		1,050 bags 52.5 t	8.8 t urea to 14 villages	0
		0	15	18	59	191	75

Figure 13. Performance of revolving fund

¹⁶ Theoretical maximum- 8-10 t/ ha. Practical maximum - 4-5 t/ ha

In Qorioley, 122.5 ha were planted. The RGA loaned 6,125kg of seed and 5,980 kg were repaid (98%). They loaned 33,650 kg of Urea and 41,400 kg of seed equivalent were returned (81.3%). In Deyr season 2000-2001, 75 ha were planted and present Gu season 25-30 ha is being planted.

Clearly, the revolving fund is a positive asset for encouraging marginal farmers to come into rice production. The fact that the project operates in a fragile security situation does increase the risk of failure in individual places. As happened in Jowhar, the revolving capital has gone out of the hands of the official (newly elected) RGA. The capital is held in the form of rice seed and paddy rice, and it is not clear in what circumstances this material is now being used. It could have been divided up between the old committee members. Farmers opposed to the present regime could be still using it. From a development point of view, this is not a time to give up on the idea. It is a time to try again when the circumstances are favourable. However, next time, there should be negotiating. Cefa could offer to contribute to a revolving fund on a 50/50 basis. For every bag of rice contributed to the fund by the community, Cefa could contribute another bag. The community concerned would decide the size of the fund and Cefa would contribute, after the community has put their part in place. Whichever way it is done, the idea of the revolving funds should be supported with Cefa and EU understanding that there may be other short term 'failures' in the future.



Golweyn Women's Group milling rice under guidance of Advisor from Jowhar

6 Impact

The effect of the project on its wider environment, and its contribution to the wider sectoral objectives summarised in the projects Overall Objectives.

Figure 14 below shows the indicators for the Overall Objective. Below it is the current FSAU report for Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions. It would be difficult to claim that the whole situation is due to the Cefa project as there are too many other factors contributing not least the effects of cattle bans, TNG interventions in the rice market. Nevertheless it would be fair to claim that this project (Phase I-III) has made a significant contribution

Overall Objective: "Food Security in the Middle and Lower Shabelle improved"	Indicator: Changes in the food economy of the population as a whole and improvement of local business activities	Means of Verification: FSAU FEWS Survey
Project Purpose: "Sustainable rice production re-established in Middle Shabelle and introduced in Lower Shabelle Region"	Indicator: Changes in cropping pattern of single growers and farmers community as a whole.	NGO Reports: FSAU-FEWS report and survey. [Evidence from the field]

Figure 14. Overall Objective Indicators

6.1 Food Security Report¹⁷

Lower Shabelle

Food security situation is good in general. Deyr cereal production was well above average. As usual the bulk of maize production of southern Somalia came from Lower Shabelle (about 60%). Good yields were achieved except in Afgoi district where rainfall was less favourable to rain-fed maize. More sorghum was planted during this Deyr in most rain-fed areas of the region, which led to a very good harvest. Maize prices stabilised at about 1,700 Ssh/ kg in most producing zones since the end of December. This is slightly higher than last year at the same period and beneficial to farmers. Sorghum prices are decreasing. Terms of trade are relatively favourable to livestock owners with one local quality goat fetching about 2-3 bags of maize or 3-4 bags of Sorghum (50 kg). Water availability is still normal. Water catchments are full especially in the Wanle Weyne area (north of the region). The Shabelle river water level is considered as normal. Land preparation for the coming Gu season has already started. Animals are gathering in the rivenne areas where fodder availability is high. The malnutrition prevailing in the region is more related to diseases than to lack of food access. Cholera has been confirmed in Merka.

Middle Shabelle

Deyr crop production was above average for both maize and sorghum. Household cereal stocks have greatly improved in both irrigated and rain fed areas. In some areas, the harvested sorghum is still drying in the fields. Sesame has not been harvested yet and is performing well in general. Food availability is good in all main markets. Maize and cowpea are collected by traders and transported to Mogadicio, Hiran and Central Regions. After the slight decrease observed at harvest time (January), retail prices for local food commodities stabilized in February, at 1,800 Ssh./ kg for maize and 1,400 Ssh. Kg for sorghum (on average). Terms of trade are getting more favourable to livestock owners. Pasture and grazing conditions are normal.

6.2 Security Effects

The project has made a significant (but difficult to measure) contribution to encouraging a desire for peace and stability as more people see the benefits of increased agricultural production. As

¹⁷ Food Security Analysis Unit, March 2002

the new phase coupled with the SAASV project and the wider coalition of four NGOs in the Shabelle Valley begin to create impact the issue of actively promoting peace through community based approaches will become more important.

6.3 Confidence Effects

The increasing desire for peace is strongly linked to the building of community confidence in increasing productivity. During the increased insecurity period in late 2000 early 2001 farmers curtailed their rice growing but maintained hectareage by producing more maize. After security was re-established they have begun to increase rice production again and are keen for Cefa to increase their technical assistance and support to inputs activities.

7 Sustainability and Replicability

The likelihood of a continuation in the stream of benefits produced by the project, particularly continuation of the projects activities and achievement of results, and with particular reference to development factors of policy support, economic and financial factors, socio-cultural aspects, gender, appropriateness of technology, ecological aspects, and institutional capacity.

7.1 Continuation of Stream of Benefits

The project can certainly claim to have re-introduced rice production in middle Shabelle and to have introduced it in Lower Sahabelle. However, particularly in Phase III, there was considerable interruption in the smooth running of the project. Insecurity meant that staff skilled in promoting and strengthening the RGAs and RMA were absent. Insecurity caused a breakdown in the operation of the revolving fund, a breakdown in communications with traders, and a reduction in production area due to the higher risks involved. Market interventions by government in the rice market have reduced market prices and demand for local rice. These factors have constrained the sustainable potential of the project and need to be addressed in the new project.

7.2 Policy Support

The collective policy of EU and its NGO partners to engage in socio-economic reconstruction is very positive. The development of the Shabelle Valley coalition strengthens this approach but will require stronger coordination and proactive policy support.

With the absence of an effective government, the SACB should be expected to take a stronger supportive role in encouraging peace and development efforts and in monitoring activities that have negative impacts on the painful process of rebuilding the local economy and advocating for protective action. As things are, there seems to be a noticeable weakness in providing such collective support.

The EU has designed a programme, which has the purpose to improve the access to vulnerable groups to food and to minimise the need for free food distribution. The Results are:

- The quantities of available food items in local markets are increased, reducing dependency on imports.
- Purchasing power of vulnerable groups are increased.
- Productive structures benefiting rural communities are rehabilitated.
- Fluctuation of market prices is reduced.

Main activities aim at increasing production and diversifying sources of income through infrastructure rehabilitation, training and capacity building for the most vulnerable households. The Cefa projects have had a strong rehabilitation focus and training is focussed on technical issues. The planned programme has strong potential to move into a development mode with much stronger capacity building of local staff and community leaders (see Annex E).

7.3 Economic and Financial Factors

Very clearly, in the right economic conditions, rice production would be significantly expanded if the security and market conditions were more favourable. Nevertheless these are the conditions the farmers have to operate in. The focus on rice has had both agricultural and economic benefits for farmers but clearly rice alone is a risk crop, which can create major gains if all goes well but also major problems if things don't go well. There are also major disparities amongst participating farmers according to their respective land holdings. Poor farmers (the majority) benefit from the increased labour demand but not from direct production on their limited land holdings. It may therefore be opportune that Phase IV plans to look at farmers' production practices as a whole, to consider ways of improving their risk management practices and to encourage different options for crop diversification aimed at both local and export markets.

At the same time, the RGAs and their activities in managing revolving funds and milling have not gone very far down the road to sustainability. They have not had the level of technical support they need over a sufficiently long period for them to approach sustainable levels of operation. During the period of Phase III, the security and market conditions have worked against them, and although they are still functioning in Lower Shabelle, they all need considerable training and backup for the full period of the new project.

The recent gifts of rice from Saudi Arabia and Libya to the TNG¹⁸ have seriously depressed the market for local rice and it remains to be seen whether this is a one off situation or more permanent. At present, farmers have responded by reducing rice hectareage and going back to maize and sorghum. This also has not helped them because of the significant amounts of food aid being brought in by CARE and WFP. Markets potential and movements monitoring should be a significant activity in the new phase of the project.

7.4 Socio-Cultural Aspects

The strong clan/family identity amongst communities is both a blessing and a curse. A blessing because it can unleash strong collaborative and supportive action within recognised 'in groups' which development interventions can connect with and enable rapid transfer of technology and ideas. On the other hand, the rigid traditional animosity between different groups and the inability to develop any sustained cross-group collaboration acts as a serious barrier to peace development and the promotion of sustainable poverty reduction and food security activities. In many ways, Somali society displays extreme forms of democratic governance. However, this seems to show that extreme democracy does not function well and the more limited forms of democracy found in other parts of the world may be more optimal. Nevertheless, the strategy of the international community including Cefa seems to be to ignore the endemic insecurity and concentrate on humanitarian action and limited development responses. With the promotion of a coordinated four-agency coalition in the Shabelle Valley, it is difficult to see how these aspects can be ignored. Even from a technical perspective the need to promote close collaboration and coordination of effort is important because of the potential for communities to exploit gaps and inconsistencies in this approach.

In the project areas, many of the farmers are Bantu. Sixty percent or more are farming on areas of one hectares or less and these are the poorest amongst irrigating farmers. Of course, rain-fed

¹⁸ Normally farmers would sell rice to market at 220,000- 240,000 Ssh./ bag. But are now selling at 150,000 Ssh. Traders are buying government rice @ 180,000-200,000Ssh./bag and selling at 280,000-300,000Ssh/ bag.

farmers and pastoralists are much more vulnerable to food insecurity shocks. Many pastoralists are in fact agro-pastoralists with part of a family group carrying out rain-fed sorghum production. The project does not address these at all and they represent more than 50% of the population.

7.5 Gender Aspects

Figure 15 below is a seasonal calendar for rice production in Bannaaney. Carried out with the Farmers Committee (all men) and the new women's group, who joined the meeting. It is important to ensure high levels of involvement of women in all aspects of the project in particular, as they do at least half the work.

Rice crop cycle activity	Women's roles	Men's roles
	%	%
Land preparation	50	50
Planting	50	50
Transplanting	50	50
Irrigating	0	100
Weeding	90	10
Harvesting	60	40
Threshing	40	60
Bird control	Children	Children
Cooking	100	0
	55	45

Figure 15. Seasonal calendar for rice production

Interestingly, the only women in the Cefa team from the field to Nairobi Office are performing domestic or secretarial tasks. There is no woman in a decision-making position in the entire structure as far as Nairobi. The Italy situation is not known. So it seems that Cefa is pretty gender 'blind' and this subject does not appear to be a priority issue. At the project level this may be about to change as recently a group of women and men¹⁹ approached Cefa in Golweyne near Qorioley requesting assistance to engage in growing rice, and Cefa has responded by agreeing to work with them. They are now growing 8 ha of rice on rented land.

7.6 Technology

The new seeds introduced represent the best technology available and is accepted by the farmers, although the high requirement for fertiliser inputs to make maximum gains is a constraint to many farmers. There is a need to look at other crops with lower inputs requirement, but still high value added, that might complement traditional crops and rice in an improved cropping cycle. This is clearly understood by Cefa as the new project is designed to focus on alternative crops that have a more poverty-focussed impact.



¹⁹ Later news after the mission ended is that the women have thrown the men out of the group on the grounds of unreliability.

7.7 Sustainable Resource Management Aspects

There may be some potential in the introduction of crops, which improve soil salinity management that is mentioned as a problem in some areas. In fact, it would be valuable to do a baseline survey of salinity status in all project areas to determine what present salinity levels are. There is a certain amount of pressure from traders to use chemical pesticides. Cefa has included pesticides in its training package, suggesting that it is not economical to use pesticides as the crop losses through non-use are apparently less than the cost of chemical use.

The whole issue of natural resource management is both large and urgent. Over the last ten years uncontrolled charcoal manufacture and sale have had serious negative, long-term impacts in the Shabelle catchment in both Somalia and in Ethiopia. Deforestation and consequent soil erosion are accelerating at alarming rates. Ideally, a major catchment-wide Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) should be carried out and Environmental Impact Assessments incorporated into all Donor/NGO projects in both the Shabelle and Juba catchments. Of course, such action goes well beyond the scope and capacity of the project under review. Nevertheless, this factor is a major issue working against ultimate sustainability and replicability in Somalia and generally receives very little attention.

7.8 Institutional Capacity

There is strong evidence that the farmers groups first involved in rice production are sustainably using the techniques being promoted in the training package in the Middle Shabelle area. This is less evident in Lower Shabelle, where the time spent in promoting agriculture has been less. It is evident that there is need for an intensive training programme to build the operating capacity of all the RGAs. For a considerable part of Phase III, Cefa's expatriate staff were not able to function and it is in the area of association business management that needs the most focus and technical backstopping. It cannot be considered that the existing institutions are anywhere near being sustainable organisations. Jowhar RGA staff, for example, ran away from the town a year ago with the coming of Mohammed Dere and a new executive appointed by Mohammed Dere. An important aspect here is that the original team representatives of farmers. However, the new group of farmers are also businessmen. In Lower Shabelle, the executive committees are strongly dominated by businessmen.

Even so, there is a lot of work to do to strengthen these groups in operational management and also in the whole area of market development. The projects carried out so far have had a strong technical focus. In this regard considerable success has been generated. However, little effort has been focused on building the capacity of Cefa staff or community leaders in development methods so that the communities themselves address the wider issues undermining food security and livelihoods.

The most serious negative impact on the success of the projects is and will continue to be that of the absence of peace, yet there is no Result or set of activities that directly address this issue (see Annexes D and E)

8 Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1 Overall Outcome to Date

Over the three phases of the project, continuous progress has been made. Certainly it can be said that rice production has been re-introduced in Middle Shabelle and introduced in Lower Shabelle, but it cannot be said that this is yet sustainable. Major interruptions to project implementation during Phase III, due to insecurity as well as flooding, have held the growth of sustainability back. Planned targets for the phase have generally not been met and currently insecurity but particularly market issues are holding further progress back.

Cefa, with the support of EU Somalia Unit, have introduced a second project in the same area, which integrates infrastructure rehabilitation with a wider agronomic package that continues support to rice production, and seeks to promote crop diversification. This represents a good interpretation of the situation and is a natural progression from the Rice Project. It was a good idea to allow an overlap period of the two projects so that the new project can become established and can learn from the experience of the rice project. CIDP/ SAASV should heavily concentrate on the training of RGA/RMA operational staff over the whole phase and carefully monitor progress in order to withdraw step-by-step as capacities improve.

The CIDP Financing Agreement is consistent with the need to: continue support to rice production, research possible diversification into other crops to improve farmers' risk management strategies, and focus more on the poorer (1 ha or less) farmers. There should be a much stronger focus on capacity building for farmers' groups and canal committees, as well as, institutional strengthening of RGAs and the RMA. To do this, the present Result 1 needs revising to broaden its scope and should be given much more emphasis than the present technical training envisaged.

8.2 Future Developments

It would not be a good idea to operate the two projects separately with different staff in the same areas and with overlapping functions. Cefa's intention is therefore to integrate the two projects from the beginning.

1. The combined agronomic package of the SAASV and CIDP projects should operate with one common strategy and implement one common work plan in the two separate operating areas with total integration of staff and a common staff training programme.
2. Figure 16 below suggests a clear management structure, which leaves the direct management of both projects under the management of the SAASV Project Manager. It introduces integration of the two projects by bringing the senior expatriate position of CIDP alongside the Technical Manager (TM) of the SAASV project and dividing the tasks between them so that the SAASV Technical Manager focuses on all aspects of infrastructure development and the CIDP Technical Manager focuses on all aspects of the agronomy components of both SAASV and CIDP. The two Senior Local Agronomists would then be allocated one for Lower Shabelle and one for Middle Shabelle both reporting to the TM-Agronomy. This leaves the original position of Project Manager CIDP unaccounted for. It is proposed that this position comes across as Technical Manager for institutional capacity building within

Cefa linking with the partner agencies of the coalition (CARE, Concern, ADRA) as well as the link person with ICRESAT and UNA (crop type and variety –research and development and IPM). This arrangement also leaves flexibility in duty assignment at the Technical Manager level (eg. If the TM Infrastructure is on a mission to support activities in a Concern area, the TM-Liaison can cover for his absence in the Cefa project.

This means that the SAASV crop activities and the CIDP activities can be operated within one extension system with all extension staff being trained and operating under one community based, participatory approach.




Figure 15. Proposed Combined Organisational structure of SAASV and CIDP

The Project Manager has overall management of the combined projects and would be the principal reporter on all SAASV activities. From a EU perspective the CIDP project would

²⁰ Solid lines come under the SAASV budget; Dotted lines come under CIDP budget (subject to this review). Double lines are extra staff covered by CIDP budget.

need to be reported separately (separate Financing Agreement). This would be the task of the TM- Agronomy. Surveyors in Lower and Middle Shabelle report to the TM-Infrastructure and extensionists would report to the respective Senior Local Agronomists.²¹

3. The combined management team should hold regular meetings to ensure regular communication within the team and form the strategic planning/decision-making group. These meetings should take place at agreed regular time intervals (say quarterly at TM level and monthly at Extension Team level). The frequency of meetings should be used as an indicator in the project M&E system.
4. There should be a development capacity building component introduced at the Results level. Although the Coalition Programme puts CARE as lead agency for community mobilisation, there needs to be a capacity building element within the Cefa project as of basic necessity for the sustainability of the Cefa project. These projects are now in transition from rehabilitation to a development status and this should be encouraged.

CIDP has a considerable track record in community based participatory extension with very strong links to specific communities. These extensionists are experts in training farmers in rice growing but have no other formal training in development principles and practice. Given the track record of all NGOs in southern Somalia, where there are frequent interruptions and withdrawal of expatriate staff, it should be a major priority to provide training and capacity building to local staff so that they can better continue with activities as local teams when necessary.


This would require a basic training programme to introduce all Cefa staff to methodologies such as PRA tools, Participatory Problem Analysis and Community Action Planning, conflict analysis tools, civic education skills and participatory monitoring and evaluation. These skills are not entrenched in the Cefa team (with notable individual exceptions) and would require a four-phase training programme spread over 18 months, first to build the capacity of Cefa staff and then to encourage extension staff to train farmers groups operating in the project. This capacity building is fundamental to the long-term sustainability of the project and would eventually be integrated with the more technical aspects on canal management, oil production etc.

The SAASV project requires a baseline survey with the intention of gathering base line data for the entire project within the first three months. It is recommended that baseline data be collected at different levels as follows.

Level 1

Engineering data is gathered with regards to the irrigation system network (this is already been done by the SAASV Team) in order to understand the whole system and to make basic decisions regarding where the canal rehabilitation activities can create the greatest impact in terms of the largest number of people assisted. When this is done, it can inform the project on which areas to focus on concerning village sites and population concentrations.

²¹ SAASV Positions are shown in Heavy Black boxes; CIDP positions are shown in dotted boxes



Private contractors in Qorzokey area maintaining canals

Level 2

Once a decision is made about which infrastructure area to focus on, then the village clusters concerned can be defined. Discussions should then be held with the local extension staff concerning their knowledge about individual villages and their likely responses to development interventions (one village might be known for being uncooperative and another for its willingness to cooperate and to contribute to its own development). From this discussion, a group of initial villages would be chosen to carry out initial dialogue and baseline data gathering.



Secondary canal unused by community after rehabilitation in an earlier Cefa project

- At this point, the Cefa Team, at all levels, would undergo a first phase participatory planning training course in the project areas using an outside facilitator to lead the process (this would last about 10 days with 2-3 days of introductory training and the rest in practical training in the priority villages); and directly using participatory methods to gather 2nd level baseline data for the implementation of the project (see Annex D).
- The outcome of the training would be a Community Action Plan (CAP) that forms the basis of project activities – canals and crop production in that village that would include agreements on community contribution.
- This means that socio-economic baseline data would only become available in two or three villages at the beginning of the project but would be of immediate and continuing value in those areas. Practical canal rehabilitation and crop production work would then continue throughout the project in those places²².
- Following this initial phase, extension staff would continue to engage in dialogue with other villages on their own using the skills learned in the Phase 1 training course. In this way baseline data will continue to be gathered into the project data base throughout the life of the project but linked to specific village CAPs and according to the absorptive capacity of individual villages and the operational capacity of the project team. If a village does not honour its commitments in the CAP, the project should disengage and support other villages that are honouring their commitments.

²² No baseline data collection should take place in villages where there is no intention to follow through with activities.

- The process is therefore interactive leaving the progress of the project in the hands of the people. It means that initially implementation may seem to go slowly but later progress will accelerate because all communities will begin to understand how the approach works.
5. The Project Team should invite farmer representatives to take part in a Project Advisory Group so that discussions and decisions do not take place without local involvement. This includes making decisions about canal rehabilitation. Basically, the Project Team should not be making decisions about which canal to open or which crop to trial without full participation of farmers (not businessmen).
 6. CIDP should be considered the last project that focuses on rice and this would then require a clear exit strategy leaving farmers to continue with their own skills on rice production sustainable RGAs and RMAs.
 7. CAASV should consider the canal rehabilitation as a one-phase activity in which case, capacity building of canal committees should be a major task along the lines suggested in 3. above. An exit strategy, which focuses on sustainability, should be written in to the project for this activity. The question – how will communities maintain canals after the completed rehabilitation? – should be a core question in the baseline surveys being carried out and should be a major concern of the management team in implementing the project.
 8. CAASV/CIDP should engage in dialogue with farmers about how they manage all their crop production not just rice and including maize, sorghum etc. in order to understand their risk management strategies.

The development and of a comprehensive local and export marketing review should be carried out as soon as possible in order to inform discussions about farmer risk strategies in maintaining livelihoods and food security and to make decisions about crop diversification.

9. The combined project should focus on farmers' groups/canal committees with respect to capacity building and dialogue regarding implementation and be less focussed on already established committees.
10. Decisions about which crops should be trialed and promoted should not be decided by CIDP at the outset and should be subject to intensive dialogue with farmers before going ahead. This means that extension packages should not be developed and trialed until these decisions are made.
11. 'Community contribution' should be interpreted as meaning 'total involvement of a community in the planning, designing, financing, implementing and management of an activity' not just financial or labour contributions to activities planned by someone else. Agreements on financial and material contributions should be made during the joint planning stage. The actual physical contributions made by communities should be accounted for in the same way as project funding and reported as a proportion of total expenditure.
12. The project should finalise activity monitoring indicators before the end of the first six months with each indicator being 'SMART' (S-specific, M-measurable, A-achievable, R-realistic and T-time bound).

13. There is a basic tension between the requirement of the logframe to produce results and the needs of the farmers to absorb the inputs of the project. The project leader will need to effectively balance these demands and needs. It is fundamental that the Project should proceed at the absorptive capacity of the communities and be 'demand driven'.
14. Cefa should gather more specific data relating to the impact of TNG and WFP activities on markets and farmers livelihoods. They should liaise with and lobby both the TNG and WFP through the SACB in order to minimise the negative impacts on farmers trying to become self-sufficient and encourage the SACB to better coordinate emergency and rehabilitation activities.

9 Lessons Learned

- The project has shown that it is possible to succeed in Somalia with a development-oriented approach.
- Phase III has shown that a team of local staff can function for considerable periods without back up from the expatriate staff even if output does go down. Through focusing on local capacity building, future performance can be increased even if expatriate staff are absent for long periods.
- Rice is a good crop which has created a good deal of enthusiasm amongst farmers but needs to be developed within the total risk management strategies of the poorest farmers to be sustainable.
- Market conditions are vitally important to farmers in protecting livelihoods and food security. External factors such as WFP and TNG engagement in markets have seriously negative impacts on both livelihoods and food security.
- The projects have been seriously constrained by insecurity suggesting that the new programme should directly address conflict issues through community-based conflict resolution methods and the development of activities and results on conflict issues that contribute to the project purpose and Overall Goal.

Annexes

Annex A:

Terms of Reference

PROJECT: SO/0014/IT-COF/2000
TITLE: Development of Rice Cultivation Processing and Marketing in Johwar and Qoriooley, Phase III

I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

CEFA has been working in Southern Somalia for many years, particularly in the agricultural sector, focusing on the re-introduction of rice cultivation with support from EC Somalia Unit.

From 1996 up to date, rice cultivation has been permanently re-established in Johwar district – Middle Shabelle through the implementation of two project phases. Pure seeds were made available by means of local seed multiplication. Farmers have been continuously trained and supported, a local Rice Grower Association has been re-established and is now operational. The final part of the second phase is now focusing on rice processing and produce marketing in order to complete the whole cycle from sowing to retail marketing.

In 1998, the programme extended its activities to Qooroley district in Lower Shabelle with the aim of introducing rice cultivation as a contribution to food security, as well as an alternative cash crop in the region subsequent to the international market crisis on Somali bananas. Up to date, the initial tests are set to be complete and these will form the basis (condition) for large-scale introduction in the immediate future.

The Project's Objective

In continuity with the previous phases, the overall objective is to contribute to the general improvement of food security in Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. The contribution will be in terms of sustainable rice production re-established in Middle Shabelle and rice cultivation introduced in Lower Shabelle.

Problems to be Addressed

Middle Shabelle.

- Capacity building and backstopping to facilitate long term sustainability of the production process etc through the farming community and Rice Growers Association.
- Rice processing and marketing, completing the whole cycle from sowing to retail marketing

Lower Shabelle.

- Training of farmers on rice cultivation.
- Rice seed quality improvement.
- Introduction of cultivation on a large scale.
- Support to the newly Rice Growers Association to ensure sustainability at the end of the project.

Results of the Project

The main results was to increase production of rice, one of the staple food for Somalis, produce processing and marketing developed and local organizations operating on self reliant basis.

On the basis of the main results achieved by Phases I and II, the project continued those actions that proved to be successful, providing additional support to the processing and marketing of produce in order to complete the whole cycle from sowing to retail sale of rice.

II. THE EVALUATION'S OBJECTIVES

In recognition of the project proposal and log frame the consultant will assess the project progress and achievements. Utilizing participatory methods as much as possible, special reference will be made to the following:

1. Relevance

- Conduct a review of the project, considering the appropriateness of the project purpose and the results in respect to the core-problems identified in the project document; taking into account the physical and socio-economic environment in which the project operated.
- Review the relevance of the intervention for the beneficiaries in the project area. The changes of needs-priorities of beneficiaries over time and how project can be adapted to reflect those needs and priorities.

2. Project Implementation.

The evaluator will assess:

- The efficiency of project implementation considering timing, technical solutions and community involvement.
- The capacity building component of the project including appropriateness of training methods and suitability of messages. Identify whether farmers adopt training messages.
- The quality of results and how activities were converted into results.
- Assess the performance of the revolving fund taking the specific socio-political conditions into account.

3. Stakeholders' Involvement

- Assess the level of community participation in planning, decision-making and implementation of project activities.
- Identify and quantify the community and farmers contribution.
- Assess how stakeholders perceive and value the project.
- Assess the capacity for improvement of the Rice Growers Association.

4. Project Impact and Sustainability

- Describe the sustainable result for the beneficiaries of the project.
- Assess the project approach to gender and its impact on gender related issues.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

- Identify and describe the "lessons learned"
- Prepare recommendations for future interventions, and the 4th phase of the "Development of rice cultivation, processing and marketing".

III. EXPERTISE REQUIRED

The consultant must specify his/her qualifications and experience in a detailed CV of not more than four pages.

The consultant should have the following qualifications:

- University degree in an agricultural subject (*rice production*), rural development or relevant social science.
- Extensive experience in farming systems and farmer associations of drier tropics, experience in the Horn of Africa is an added advantage.
- Practical experience in assessments, planning and implementation of interventions, strengthening farming systems including aspects of rural organization and revolving funds.
- Demonstrated experience in the execution of studies and evaluations,
- Knowledgeable of project cycle management in regard to the EC format,
- Fluent in English, both in reading and writing.

IV. REPORTING

Reports shall be submitted to the EC Somalia Unit and CEFA as follows:

- An inception report in 2 copies, three working days after the end of the fieldwork to be discussed in Nairobi, involving the EC Somalia Unit and CEFA.
- A draft report in 2 copies, 10 days after the fieldwork has been completed.
- A final report in 6 copies, 10 days after having received comments on the draft report by the EC Somalia Unit and CEFA.

V. WORKPLAN

International and internal travel for consultant	4 days
Briefing and research in Nairobi	2 days
Field study	10 days
Reporting and de-briefing	4 days
Total	20 days

Evaluation will require extensive travel in the field where the project is being implemented.

VI. ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSULTANT BY THE CONTRACTING AUTHORITY

The contracting authority will make the following information and facilities available to the consultant:

At the EC Somalia Unit:

- Relevant reports, documents, maps and other data.

Through ECHO Flight:

- Return flight from Nairobi to Somalia or paid UNCAS flight and domestic flights in Somalia.

At CEFA:

- Provide logistical support;
- Avail relevant reports, documents, maps and other data;
- Facilitate access to consultations with international research stations and other relevant institutions and organizations in Nairobi;
- Facilitate the field study (transport, local communications and access to stakeholders); accommodation is available in Merka and Jowhar.

VI ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY


- The project evaluation will be conducted as a household survey in each of the areas where the project was implemented. The household will be considered as a basic sampling unit.
- A number of representative villages will be visited in each of the project areas. At least 3-4 households will be interviewed from each village.
- About 15 clusters of farmers exist in the intervention area. Each cluster has a representative in "Farmers Association", who will assist in the evaluation survey.

VII. RESPONSIBILITIES OF EVALUATION REPORT


- The evaluation report shall be the property of the EC Somalia Unit.
- Information gathered and compiled in this report will be available at the EC Somalia Unit, Nairobi and will be used as reference material to draw upon during the 4th phase of the project implementation.
- CEFA field staff will use this document as a learning process to adapt lessons learned and improve in the 4th phase of the project.

Annex B:
Maps of the Area

SOMALIA ADMINISTRATIVE MAP



SOMALIA OVERVIEW MAP



Annex C:

Documents Consulted

Number	Document
1	Cefa, 25 years of International Voluntary Service, Cefa Bologna 1994
2	Integrated Pest Management Project, Somalia, UNA
3	Project Financial Report, Phase III
4	Crops Improvement and Diversification, Project Proposal Phase IV, November 2001
5	Profitability of the Jowhar Rice Milling Machine Nov'98, Dec'98, Jan '00
6	Profitability Data for Rice Cultivation for small farmers and commercial farmers, Deyr 1998 in Jowhar
7	Profitability Data for Rice Cultivation for small farmers and commercial farmers, Gu 1999 in Jowhar
8	Rice Growers Association Milling Record, Jenaale, 30/08/01 to 14/10/01 and Deyr Season 2001
9	Qorioley Status Report 2002, Gu season 2001
10	FSAU Food Security Reports for February, March, 2002
11	Quarterly Reports for last quarter Phase II and all Quarters Phase III
12	Final Report 214-NGO-A02-97 March 1996-February 2000.
13	Final Report Phase III, 1 st April 2000- 30 th September 2001,
14	Summary Proceedings of the Shabelle River Rehabilitation Project, April 5 th 2002
15	SACB Directory, March 2001
16	1: 100,000 scale maps of the area NA-38-78; NA-38-77,
17	Visual Codes Training manual for Rice Production in the project areas.
18	The Water and Land Information Management System for Somalia, Concept Paper, FAO, October 2001
19	LAS Workshop Report, Merka, Lower Shabelle Region, September 1997
20	The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia- The War Behind the War, Ed. C Besteman and LV Cassanelli
21	Summary of the Results of the Workshop on Community Contribution, Support Project, 5 th December, 2001, Caritas Switzerland

Annex D:

Notes on Capacity Building Approach¹

Participatory Planning

Planning is a deliberate and systematic process of prioritising, structuring and laying down visions, objectives and strategies, and activities to realise those visions and objectives. It is the first step of any development process and marks the beginning of the journey through this process. Planning is very important in that it sets the destination, points the direction to be taken, and maps out the territory and the routes to be followed.

In a participatory context, planning involves the identification of problems, the prioritisation of needs, and the designing of intervention strategies by all stakeholders. If done well and realistically, planning creates a pathway towards social, economic, environmental and political change in the lives of all the stakeholders.

Planning lays a strong foundation for all development efforts. It gives the stakeholders a clear picture of the process they want to undertake and the positive changes they anticipate. It also sets a basis for progress and impact monitoring to determine whether the perceived change is desirable and consistent with development goals and objectives.

Planning must be a people centred process – a process whose major objective is to empower people and motivate them to take initiatives for their own development, determine their destiny and shape their future. A participatory process puts trust in the people's capabilities and provides them with an opportunity to analyse and reflect on their own situation – their past, present and future.

The planning stage of the journey requires a set of participatory tools and methods. The tools and methods will enable the stakeholders to start a systematic process of learning through data gathering and analysis. This will create opportunities for dialogue and partnership among the stakeholders involved in the planning process.

PRA is one of the world's best-known participatory methodologies. Its main objective is to enable communities and development agents to learn about the physical, social and economic conditions affecting their lives. Through a participatory facilitation process, PRA helps the teams to gather and analyse socio-economic data, and to draw up Community Action Plans (CAPs).


PRA facilitates the involvement of local people, whether in rural or urban situations, in a reflection of the conditions and issues that affect their lives. It empowers them, especially the poor, in as much as they are able to initiate and participate in development projects designed to improve the quality of their lives. It draws on their own experience, knowledge and skills.

The PRA approach utilises a wide variety of visual tools to encourage the participation of community groups irrespective of their literacy levels. The PRA tools are described as follows:

¹ Extract from *A Participatory Journey* written and produced by Ralph Johnstone, John H Fox, Sammy Musyoki and Dekha Ibrahim, Intermedia, 1999.

1. Sketch Maps


Sketch Maps are the primary participatory tool for collecting data about a particular area – its boundaries, layout and significant features. In the case of widely-travelled pastoralists, they are also the most ‘user-friendly’ of all data collection methods. Although maps can be used to record anything from human health to livestock movements, the most common maps are: Resource Maps, which document an area’s physical resources (crops, water points, grazing areas); Social Maps, which illustrate its social conditions (houses, wealth levels, family sizes); and Mobility Charts, which record the pattern of people’s movements.



2. Transects

A Transect is a systematic walk – or drive, or camel- or horse-ride – through a project area, gathering data to supplement that already recorded in a community’s sketch maps. The resulting diagram can present details on characteristics such as gradients, water flows, drainage systems, soil types and vegetation – as well as key problems and potential solutions. It can deepen the community development workers’ and community members’ knowledge of the area – and of relationships between the physical environment, animal resources, and human activities.

VILLAGE OF SIDRA
KORDOFAN, SUDAN



From *Participatory Rapid Appraisal for Community Development* by Joachim Theis and Heather M. Grady, published by the International Institute for Environment and Development and Save the Children, 1991

3. Timelines or Historical Profiles

The Timeline is a history of major events in the recollected life of a community – important incidents, developments, disasters and achievements. The Timeline helps both community development workers and community members to understand why things are the way they are. Like all historical records, it can reveal how the community commonly responds to problems and opportunities.

Illustration:

Dandu: The First Fifty Years

Year	Event	Effect	Impact	Coping Mechanism
1949	Ibrahim Moh'd Melow becomes colonial chief	First settlement	Creation of administration	Division of water resources
1964	Dombur shifra war	Deaths of people; loss of livestock; residents abandon settlement	Poverty	Exodus to Kijijis
1969	End of war	Peace returns	Resettlement	None
1974	Misi Ali elected in first parliamentary election	Start of political representation	Start of development	None
1975	Start of Ethiopia-Somalia war	Residents surrender	Start of banditry	Purchase of firearms
1979	First GoK chief appointed	First pastoralists settle in area	Resettlement	None
1980/1	Severe drought	Displacement of people; loss of livestock; chief flees	Poverty	Residents flee to Ethiopia and other settlements
1985	Appointment of assistant chief	Runaways return	Resettlement; opening of new schools and other projects	Increased prayers to deal with hardships
1992	Chief Dahir dies; Garrel-Borana conflict	Killing of people; loss of livestock	Poverty; increased number of orphans	Relief and refugee settlement
1993	Chief M. M. Hussein appointed	Killings stop; people return	Resettlement; return of development	Prayers
1993/4	EDRP project launched; volume of relief increases	Dams desilted; manyattas constructed	Access to water improved; less dependency syndrome	None
1995	Opening of health centres; Shiekh Abbey appointed drought monitor	Increased access to water; Dandu appears in drought bulletin	Reduced mortality; increased data collection	More involvement in data collection
1995/6	Agricultural officer posted to Dandu	Intensified farming; construction of Kiliwejabsa dam	Catchment appraisal initiated	Abandoning of old methods
1997/8	El Nino floods	Severe human and livestock diseases; huge loss of assets	Increased human and livestock mortality; reduced incomes	Patience and endurance; praying; use of savings
1997/8	First woman elected to civic post in Dandu	Perception as bad omen for community	Poor attendance at Islamic rally; loss of hope	Support for representation by clan elders
1998	Outbreak of labaa tick fever	High livestock mortality	Increased vulnerability to drought	Use of boiled bagar and camel urine
Sept. 1998	Degodia-Boran conflict	Massacre at Bagalla; displacement of people; loss of livestock	Fear throughout region; stagnation of business	Movement to urban centres and safe areas
Nov. 1998	First PRA conducted by ALRMP Mobile Extension Team	Increased awareness and support for development	Yet to be observed	Preparing for cost-sharing initiative

4. Seasonal Calendars


A Seasonal Calendar explores seasonal constraints and opportunities by recording changes in a community's activities and practices month by month throughout a typical year. It indicates whether there are common problems that recur at certain times of the year. Such a calendar can assist in determining, for example, the availability of water and pasture, of labour or cash – and the appropriate timing of project activities.

5. Semi-Structured Interviews

Unlike formal 'structured' interviews in which all the questions are pre-determined, the Semi-Structured Interview allows for more flexible questioning and helps the facilitator to break down the barriers surrounding sensitive local issues. As with all data-gathering and analytical exercises, it is important to include a broad cross-section of people among your interviewees – community leaders, elders, teachers, local officials, as well as 'ordinary people' – to confirm that what is being said in meetings really does reflect the views and aspirations of the whole community. It is equally important to achieve a good balance between men and women, old and young, rich and poor. As to the style of interviewing, the choice is between formal and informal. If the intention is to make people relax and encourage them to be open and frank, then an informal, friendly but purposeful approach is, of course, more likely to succeed.


6. Venn Diagrams

A Venn Diagram is a map of institutional relationships, using symbols or circles of varying sizes to represent individuals or organisations and their perceived importance to a community or project. The size of the symbols or circles indicates their importance; the positioning – overlapping, touching or separate – indicates their degree of contact. The diagram can thus illustrate the relationships between several different institutions – and reveal those most in need of improvement.



7. Livelihood Analysis

Livelihood Analysis is a tool for ranking the economic activities or resources that affect the livelihoods of a specific household or community. First the subjects under discussion listed and ranked through 'proportional piling' – by piling beans, seeds or stones in circles on the ground. The information is then transferred to a pie-chart to illustrate the importance of each activity or resource. This can in turn be used in the preparation of a Mobility Map to show the flow resources between communities.




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8. Livelihood or Mobility Mapping

Once you have identified and ranked the basic resources used and produced by a community, the information can be transferred to a Livelihood or Mobility Map – a map showing how resources flow to and from (or in more commercial terms, how they are imported and exported by) the community.

Livelihood Maps are an entertaining, challenging and invariably informative method of establishing and analysing the movement of goods and services between a community and neighbouring settlements. Like Resource Social Maps, they often lead comprehensive discussion about the constraints, opportunities and requirements associated with community's external trade



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9. Ranking

This is a prioritisation exercise: how to determine, through a structured group discussion, which problems or objectives should be dealt with first. Two techniques can be used: Voting and Preference Ranking.

1. For **Voting**, the group simply votes on each problem from the Problem Tree (or each objective from the Objectives Tree), with each participant casting a vote for what he or she believes is the most pressing issue. The issue that attracts the most votes is the winner – after some discussion, of course, to check that this really is what the group thinks is the most vital line of action.
2. In **Preference Ranking**, the problems/objectives are first paired up in a matrix – so that each problem/objective is matched up with all the others, thus ensuring a more focused consideration and eliminating the possibility of a tie. This is done by drawing up a matrix with the same problems/objectives on both axes.

PROBLEMS	SYMBOL	SCORE	RANKING
1. Water	Pipe	43	1
2. Roads	'Pot hole' in ground	23	6
3. Livestock diseases	Bone	29	3
4. Human diseases	Empty medicine bottle	20	7
5. Poverty	Rag	13	13
6. Tools	Shovel	26	4
7. Livestock market	Coin	19	9
8. Textbooks	Book	42	2
9. Sanitation	Pit	11	14

10. Wealth Ranking

The Wealth Ranking is an important tool for establishing the relative positions of individual households within a community – and to identify the most deserving beneficiaries of a particular project.

CATEGORIES	NO. OF CATTLE	NO. OF CAMEL	NO. OF SHOATS	BUSINESS CAPABILITIES	OTHER ASSETS
<i>TAJIR</i> (RICH CLASS)	Above 100 heads	Above 100 heads	Above 300 heads	Above Ksh 200,000 or one Landrover	-
<i>DAXDAXAT</i> (MIDDLE CLASS)	Less than 100 heads	Less than 100 heads and above 40 heads	Above 100 but less than 300 heads	Less than Ksh100,000	-
<i>MASKIN</i> (POOR CLASS)	Less than 50 heads	Less than 40 heads	Less than 100 heads	-	-
<i>FUQARA</i>	Below 4 heads	Below 6 heads	Below 10 heads	-	-

11. Problem Trees

The Problem Tree is an activity in which community members are asked to declare their problems – and then to explore their causes. Once a cause is stated, the group is prompted to consider the cause of that cause – and so on, until a ‘root cause’ is identified. Similarly, once an effect is identified, the group is encouraged to consider its further effects.

12. Objectives Trees

The Objectives Tree involves a natural transformation of the Problem Tree, turning it on its head to identify objectives in relation to specific problems.

13. Problem and Solution Assessment Chart

If the process of drawing up problem and objectives trees proves complicated or laborious, the Problem and Solution Assessment Chart provides a simple structure for combining the two. After identifying the causes of each problem, the community should consider the means they have been undertaking to address it (‘coping strategies’) and more sustainable solutions for the future (‘proposed solutions’).

Problem	Causes	Coping Strategies	Proposed Solutions
Livestock diseases <i>Effects:</i> High rate of livestock death Lack of food Human disease Malnutrition Increasing human death	1. Inadequate drug supply High cost of drugs Low incomes Poor livestock prices Distances to towns Insecurity	Using traditional medicines and herbs Using human drugs Using heat therapy Quran citations Sprinkling of blessed water Using salty sand and grass supplements Treating with pieces of infected liver	Train traditional animal health workers Form pastoral assn. to coordinate drug purchase & supply Strengthen local marketing groups Strengthen management of boreholes along stock routes

14. Community Action Plans

The Community Action Plan (CAP) is a statement of a community's development priorities and a description of what it intends to do to achieve its development objectives. It represents the culmination of the various data collections, analyses and prioritisation activities that have been presented so far in these guidelines. The CAP should incorporate the following:

- Priority problems
- Proposed actions
- Target area
- Resources and budget required – both community contributions and external assistance
- Responsibilities of the various actors in the proposed development initiatives
- Timeframe
- Other remarks.

Problem	Action	Target	Community Contribution	External Contribution	Responsibility	Timeframe	Remarks

Annex E:

Summary of Main Events During Phase III

Time	Project Events	Insecurity Events
1 st April 2000	Start of Project	
5 th April	Project Team meets with local Administration	
18 th April		1 ½ hour gun battle in Jowhar
20 th April		Expatriate staff restricted to office in Jowhar
22 nd April- 26 th April	Work on Qaloow canal started and completed	
7 th May 2000		Milling compound activities stopped by Barahow Mohammed Jumale forces
4-8 th May	EU Somali Unit staff visit	
13 th May	Seed multiplication sites at Janaale and Bullo Shiekh established (3 ha)	
18 th May		Fighting between Jiddo and Garre Clans (through June and July)
Late May 2000	Both Middle and Lower Shabelle affected by Bad floods affecting all crops	
8 th June		Echo Flight aircraft shot at causing suspension of flights to Merka
15 th June		Granade explosion in Merka COSV compound led to evacuation of all expatriate staff from Lower Shabelle
29 June-10 July		Meetings involving 200 people in Merka and Qorioley to try and control clan fighting
1 st -3 rd August		Fighting in Jowhar between Mohammed Musa and Agonyer clans Cefa evacuation from Jowhar and suspension of Echo flights
13 th August 2000	700 bags of Urea ordered and delivered 15 th September	
17 th August 2000	Qorioley Rice Growers Association formed	
17 th September 2000- March 2001		Jowhar Milling Compound taken over by Barahow Mohammed Jumale. One irrigation Pump, Milling machine parts and two weighing scales stolen. He was removed on 28 th April.
20 th September 2000	Purchase of 5,000 printed (50 kg bags) delivered in Somalia mid-June 2001	
October-November 2000		Continual Clan Fighting in Merka/Qorioley areas
October 2000-March 2001		Continual clan fighting in Jowhar alternating between Haawadle and Galjel clans sometimes and at other times the Agoon-yar and Mohammed Muse Abgal clans.
15 th October 2000	The Project Managers contract was terminated because of the inability of expatriate staff to enter the project areas in Somalia	
21 st November 2000	Rice Milling Machine handed over to Qonioley RGA	
1 st December		The malfunctioning Islamic Court in Merka was replaced with another Islamic court from Mogadicio This resulted in unauthorised roadblocks and road closures being removed and banditry reduced.

10 th January 2001		Fighting in the villages of Bannaaney and Barrey near Jowhar between the Wasengali and Wak-biyo sub-clans over land and water use resulted in around 840 houses destroyed, 10-18 people killed and 2,000-3,000 people displaced to Jowhar Town.
2 nd February 2001	Request for a six month no cost extension- granted 19 th February	
3 rd February, 7 th , 14 th June, 26 th July and 30 th August 2001	Combined meetings between Cefa, Janaale, and Qorioley RGA's	
16 th February 2001	Janaale RGA executive and constitution formed and officially recognised	
20 th February 2001		A granade exploded near the Merka CASV compound.
26 th February		A group called Bimaal Resistance Movement claimed responsibility and said that unless the expatriats left within 15 days compounds would be bombed and there would be a possible kidnapping of one expatnate member.
28 th February and 1 st April 2001		Meetings between expatriate staff and local clan elders to discuss the above threats. The elders sent letters to all UN Agencies and NGO's to guarantee security and state their support for the work of these groups as well as their encouragement for future projects to be implemented in the Districts of Merka and Qorioley. There was no further action from the group.
6 th March		A meeting between personnel from International Aid Groups and ministers and vice-ministers from the Interim Government to discuss the Interim Governments plans for the transitional period. They asked aid groups to continue and expand their projects as they did not have money to do the work that is being implemented to assist the communities.
7 th March	Purchased 1,050 bags of urea fertiliser- delivered to Janaale and Qorioley on 24 th April	
10 th March 2001- 30 th September	Control of the Revolving Fund given to the Janaale and Qorioley RGAs making it their responsibility to control the distribution and restitution of inputs.	
10 th March	One Rice Milling machine handed over to the Janaale RGA for use	
14 th March	Purchased 50kg bags- delivered 18 th May	
14 th March	Purchased 5 rice milling Machines plus spare parts- delivered 7 th June	
15 th March		Mohamed Dere entered Jowhar And proclaimed himself the Governor of Middle Shabelle. From this point up to the end of the project "unofficial road blocks were removed, clan clashes munimised to almost nothing and the physical security for expatnate staff in and around Jowhar was assured.
16 th March	Purchased two irrigation pumps. Delivered 18 th May	
26 th March		Request from New Middle Shebelle Administration for International Aid Agencies and Organisations to return to Jowhar

27 th March	Berdahsalah seed multiplication plot planted (15ha)	
31 st March		Reduction in activity in Jowhar to assess the acceptance of local clans, of intent and performance of the new Administration
May and Early June		Cefa missions to Jowhar to assess the resumption of project activities in the Middle Shabelle. Activities on reduced scale began on July 1st
June-September		Interim Government attempted to establish 21 man committees in each district of the Lower Shabelle to Administer the districts
6 th July		Reopened Jowhar activities and 3 field staff re-contracted
8 th July-30 th September		Attempts to hand over a milling machine to the RMA in Jowhar thwarted by Mohammed Dere Administration
July to September		Retaliatory killings of people during fighting between mainly Biimaal and Habagidir clans
12 th July		Letter sent by Mohammed Dere to Aid Agencies and Organisations stating the conditions under which they were to work in Middle Shabelle. These contravened the SACB code of conduct and resulted in a combined meeting in Jowhar between local Administration, SACB, UN and Jowhar International NGO representatives. From this a letter of Agreement on the working relationships between all those bodies was signed on 3 rd August
15 th July/ 18 th / and 5 th August		Land Mines exploded killing people in the Bulo Marer, Bulo Mareeta and Kutunwarrey areas. This appeared to be an overflow from the fighting for control of Kismayo
14 th July		All clans in Merka district sign a peace agreement- no lasting positive results from this
26 th July		The Islamic court left Merka District, two days later roadblocks began to appear and from then until the projects end these were a constant problem. in varying degrees, for all road users
29 th July	Handing over a water pump to the Janaale RGA for use to pump extra water from plots	
24 th August	A new Jowhar RGA executive was elected through the General Assembly of rice Growers and ratified by the Administration on 27 th August	
7 th September		Two grenades exploded in Merka town, several people injured but no deaths- nobody claimed responsibility
11 th September	Engineers who were to rehabilitate the drying areas and milling compounds of the janaale and Qorioley RGA's signed an agreement with Cefa	
14 th September	An external Evaluation Contract was signed. It was subsequently postponed until the start of the next phase of the project on 21 st September due to security problems which prevented expatriates from entering Somalia and visiting project areas.	